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I. Summary 
 
When the Tatmadaw entered my village they killed men and beat women when they 
caught them.1  
 
Burmese soldiers came into Tho Mer Kee village and burnt down all the houses. They 
killed all our pigs, goats and chickens––and then shot the buffalos for fun.2 
 
We had to flee to the jungle, where we stayed for a week, with very little food. Then 
we returned to re-build our homes, and try to farm again. However, the next year, 
they [the Tatmadaw] came and destroyed our village again.3 
 
While the nonviolent struggle of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi against the Burmese military 
government’s continuing repression has captured the world’s attention, the profound 
human rights and humanitarian crisis endured by Burma’s ethnic minority communities 
has largely been ignored.4 
  
Decades of armed conflict have devastated ethnic minority communities, which make up 
approximately 35 percent of Burma’s population. The Burmese army, or Tatmadaw, has 
for many years carried out numerous and widespread summary executions, looting, 
torture, rape and other sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and torture, forced labor, 
recruitment of child soldiers, and the displacement and demolition of entire villages as 
part of military operations against ethnic minority armed opposition groups. Civilians 
bear the brunt of a state of almost perpetual conflict and militarization.  
 
Violations of international human rights and humanitarian law (the laws of war) by the 
Tatmadaw have been particularly acute in eastern Karen state, which runs along the 
northwestern border of Thailand. One woman described to Human Rights Watch more 
than twenty years of Tatmadaw brutality:  
                                                   
1 Human Rights Watch interview conducted at Thwa Hta village, Papun District, June 2003. 
2 Human Rights Watch interview with N.L. at Hor Ker IDP settlement, Papun District, May 2003. 
3 Human Rights Watch interview with S.L. at Hor Ker IDP settlement, Papun District, May 2003. 
4 In 1989 the English name of the country was changed from Burma to Myanmar by the ruling State Law and 
Order Restoration Council (SLORC, now called the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC). English 
versions of place names were changed to Burmanized versions at the same time, e.g., Rangoon became 
Yangon. The National League for Democracy, which won elections in 1990 that were subsequently rejected by 
the military government, does not recognize these name changes, and ethnic groups that are not ethnic 
Burman regard them as part of an effort to Burmanize national culture. Human Rights Watch uses the term 
“Burma.”  
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The Burmese Army troops first attacked in November 1979, while we 
were harvesting our fields near Ler Kaw village. They shot and killed my 
sister, who was only thirteen, and my cousin, who was fifteen. We had 
to flee, but they chased after us and shot and killed another villager. 
There was no fighting near the village at that time. The Burma Army 
troops just wanted to kill us Karen villagers. 
 
The Burmese soldiers attacked us again at Htee Hto Kaw Kee, in 1992. 
They shot and killed my husband and injured other villagers. The 
soldiers burned down our houses and killed and ate our animals. They 
also burned our rice barn, destroying 190 tins of rice. [They also] killed 
my son-in-law, who was just collecting betel nut in the forest. He [had] 
small children. 
 
In January 1998, at Lo Kee village, my cousin’s husband was killed by 
Burmese troops when they entered the village. Many people fled to the 
jungle. In March 2002 my other cousin’s husband was also killed. Their 
house and livestock were destroyed too. 
 
The woman’s mother added more details to the account, and clarified that the Burmese 
troops faced no armed resistance that could justify their attack on the villagers: 
 
I will never forget our suffering at Ler Kaw village. When the soldiers 
shot my thirteen-year-old daughter, her intestines came out. Her father 
and I tried to save her, and escape. She was in agony, and screaming, but 
we couldn’t do anything to ease her pain. She died after an hour. We 
haven’t done anything against the government. All we had in our hands 
when their troops attacked was our paddy, and harvesting tools. If the 
soldiers had called us, we would have gone to talk with them. They 
didn’t have to shoot.5 
 
One result of the Tatmadaw’s brutal behavior has been the creation of large numbers of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees among Burma’s ethnic minority 
communities. Conflict and its consequences have been going on for so long that in many 
ethnic minority-populated areas, continuous forced relocations and displacement––
                                                   
5 Human Rights Watch interviews with N.W. and her mother from Nyaunglebin District (July 2003). 
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interspersed with occasional periods of relative stability––have become a fact of life for 
generations of poor villagers.  
 
The scale of the IDP problem in Burma is daunting. Estimates suggest that, as of late 
2004, as many as 650,000 people were internally displaced in eastern Burma alone. 
According to a recent survey, 157,000 civilians have been displaced in eastern Burma 
since the end of 2002, and at least 240 villages destroyed, relocated, or abandoned. The 
majority of displaced people live in areas controlled by the government, now known as 
the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), or by various ethnic armed groups 
that have agreed to ceasefires with the government. But approximately eighty-four 
thousand displaced people live in zones of ongoing armed conflict, where the worst 
human rights abuses continue. Many IDPs live in hiding in war zones. Another two 
million Burmese live in Thailand, including 145,000 refugees living in camps. 
 
Karen State is the location of some of the largest numbers of IDPs in Burma. Since 
2002, approximately 100,000 people have been displaced from Karen areas, which 
include parts of Pegu and Tenasserim Divisions. Though a provisional ceasefire was 
agreed in December 2003 between the SPDC and the Karen National Union (KNU), 
sporadic fighting continues. Tatmadaw military operations against the KNU’s army, the 
Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), in the first months of 2005 caused numerous 
deaths and injuries to civilians in poor villages along the Thai border. They also forced 
many civilians to flee internally or to Thailand. For example, at least 9,000 civilians were 
displaced in Toungoo District, in the far north of Karen State bordering Karenni State, 
and in Nyaunglebin District in northwest Karen State, during major Tatmadaw offensives 
between November 2004 and February 2005.  
 
The majority of Karen IDPs have been forced out of their homes as a direct result of 
the Tatmadaw’s “Four Cuts” counter-insurgency strategy, in which the Burmese army has 
attempted to defeat armed ethnic groups by denying them access to food, funds, 
recruits, and information from other insurgent groups. H.T., a twenty-eight year-old 
Karen from Dooplaya District, described his experience with the Tatmadaw in January 
2005: 
 
There were two groups [of Tatmadaw soldiers]. The first was 
commanded by Lt. Soe Myint Aw, and the second was commanded by 
Captain Toe Toe Aung. They had about sixty men each. Lt. So Myint 
Aw told us that the “strategic commander” gave them orders to attack 
the village. I just ran. It took twenty minutes to walk to the border. We 
stayed there on Monday. There is a motorbike and a phone that 
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everyone in the village can use. We had to leave them there. I could hear 
machine gun fire and mortars when I was running to the borderline. I 
am afraid for my family, and very afraid that the SPDC will kill me. It’s 
possible I will be tortured when I go back. Eleven SPDC soldiers were 
killed by the KNU. I don’t want to go back to see the [SPDC] soldiers. I 
want to go back to my village when the fighting stops but I will be 
prepared to run once again.6 
 
This report describes the situation in government-controlled areas, including relocation 
sites, which are generally not accessible from across the Thailand border. The report 
identifies two main causes of displacement:  
 
• Displacement due to armed conflict as a direct result of fighting, or because 
armed conflict has undermined human and food security and livelihood options; 
and 
• Displacement due to human rights violations, particularly land rights 
caused by Tatmadaw and militia confiscation of land and other violations of land 
rights, especially in the context of natural resource extraction, such as logging 
and mining. Other rights violations, such as forced labor, killings, torture, and 
rape, also cause displacement. 
 
The report describes patterns of abuse and forced relocation over a period of many 
years. It documents how serious violations of international humanitarian law and human 
rights abuses continue to occur in some parts of Karen State, such as Toungoo and 
Nyaunglebin Districts, while other areas are relatively quiet. It recommends a need to 
think of new and more realistic answers to the dilemmas faced by IDPs, many of whom 
may not be able––or may not want––to go home again.  
 
For this report, Human Rights Watch interviewed community leaders, representatives of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), staff at community-based organizations 
(CBOs), U.N. officials, and many others. Most important, we interviewed forty-six 
Karen IDPs living in the Papun hills, in mid-late 2003, and along the Thai border, in 
early 2005. These forty-six individuals altogether were displaced more than one thousand 
times. Incredibly, five individuals had been forcibly displaced more than one hundred 
                                                   
6 The units involved in the attack on Ka Law Gaw were Light Infantry Battalion #356 and Infantry Battalion # 
230. Both were commanded by the Regional Military Command No. 12 based in Hpa-an. It seems likely that the 
orders to attack Ka Law Gaw village came from a regional command order. 
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times. One of these five, an elderly woman, first fled to the jungle during World War II, 
when Japanese soldiers came to her village.  
 
All the interviewees for this report had been farmers and continue to derive most of 
their food from working their own or others’ rice fields. These fields remain susceptible 
to destruction by Tatmadaw patrols. Displacement often means that new land must be 
cleared for farming, rather than farmers being able to return to former swidden fields in 
sustainable rotation after fallow swiddens have regained their fertility. Over time, the 
disruption of traditional agricultural practices has seriously undermined livelihoods and 
caused encroachment by swidden farmers into primary forest, rather than rotating their 
plots in secondary forest customarily used for swidden agriculture. 
  
Many IDPs have been displaced for some time, and live alongside others who are not––
or have not recently been––displaced. Their needs may therefore be similar to those of 
other vulnerable populations in peri-urban and rural Burma. 
 
The main problems identified by interviewees were lack of consistent access to food; 
insufficient income and livelihood problems; human rights abuses and poor physical 
security related to displacement and fighting; lack of access to education and health 
services; and, finally, the problem of landmines, which destroy both land and their 
victims’ lives. Their primary need is to be able to farm properly, without disturbance, 
and thus improve income and food security, as well as better access to education and 
health services. All wanted to, as one interviewee put it, “live in peace and with justice.”  
Most of these problems are linked to longer-term structural problems, and can only be 
addressed in the context of socio-economic––and above all political––solutions to 
Burma’s protracted ethnic conflicts.  
 
The findings of this report caution against assuming that all IDPs necessarily want to 
return “home.” Returning home can be a problematic concept for people who have 
been on the move for long periods of time. Many IDPs may wish to return home, if it 
still exists, but others may want to stay put or resettle elsewhere. Some who have 
returned home or have otherwise resettled still face major problems, while others have 
not. Some have not moved and built new lives in the place to which they were displaced, 
often in the jungle hills or in a relocation site.  
 
Thus, those providing assistance should avoid taking a one-size-fits all approach to 
meeting the needs of IDPs. Instead, the focus should be on individual choice and the 
needs of specific communities. Indeed, the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, which summarize existing international law as it applies to IDPs, make 
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choice the touchstone. Competent authorities have a duty to “establish conditions, as 
well as provide the means” to allow voluntary resettlement and integration in the place 
to which people are displaced, if that is their choice.7  
 
An understanding of long-term patterns of forced displacement should inform the 
design of humanitarian, development, and socio-political interventions on behalf of the 
displaced. One aspect that deserves careful consideration is the effect of ceasefires on 
the human rights situation and on displacement. Over the past decade many armed 
ethnic groups have entered into ceasefires with the military government in Rangoon. In 
some parts of the country, ceasefires have meant a reduction in the most severe forms of 
human rights abuses, though this has not usually led to greater respect for other basic 
rights, such as freedom of expression or the right to due process of law. But in many 
cases, ceasefires have been quietly accompanied by the reemergence of local civil society 
actors. This has been one of the most important, yet under-studied, aspects of the 
ceasefires in Burma. 
 
The SPDC and KNU agreed to an informal ceasefire in December 2003. In some parts 
of Karen State, the situation began to stabilize. Across the whole of Tenasserim 
Division, and much of lower and western Karen State, there has been less fighting and 
fewer of the most severe type of human rights violations, such as extrajudicial executions 
and torture, than before. Some IDPs are beginning to return from hiding places in the 
jungle and from relocation sites to build more permanent houses and grow crops other 
than swidden rice. However, the Tatmadaw continues its aggressive use of forced labor, 
especially on road-building projects, land confiscation, and arbitrary taxation in many 
areas. It has recently stepped up attacks on a variety of armed ethnic groups. Under the 
right conditions, a ceasefire between the SPDC and the KNU could deliver a substantial 
improvement in the human rights situation, creating the space in which local and 
international organizations can begin to address the urgent needs of Karen IDPs. But 
the situation may yet return to guerilla warfare and full-scale counterinsurgency.  
 
Many of the ceasefires are now under threat. Since the purging of General Khin Nyunt 
last October, hard-liners in the SPDC have attempted to undermine ceasefires agreed 
between Rangoon and several armed ethnic groups since 1989. In mid-2005, the future 
of these ceasefires looks more and more uncertain. 
 
                                                   
7 The U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (U.N. Document E/ CN.4/1998/53/Add.2; November 11, 
1998) [online], http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/idp_gp/idp.html (English); 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/b/principles_burm1.htm (Burmese); 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/b/principles_karen1.htm (S’ghaw Karen) (retrieved May 21, 2005).  
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If the SPDC and KNU reach a genuine settlement––an outcome about which Human 
Rights Watch takes no position––the current transitional period may develop into the 
type of post-ceasefire scenario seen in Mon and Kachin States since the mid-1990s. 
There may be more space for civil society to emerge. CBOs and local NGOs can play 
important roles in the needs analysis, planning, implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation stages of projects. This is particularly true in remote areas inaccessible to 
international agencies. Donors can assist this process with careful, well-targeted grants to 
capable local organizations.  
 
Sadly, experiences in Mon and Kachin states show that displacement does not 
necessarily come to an end with the cessation of armed conflict. Instead, the causes of 
displacement may change, as the Tatmadaw expands into previously contested areas and 
confiscates land as part of its efforts to consolidate control and make money. Increased 
and more industrialized natural resource extraction and other economic activities, such 
as large-scale agricultural production and development-induced activities, including road 
and bridge construction, can lead to further displacement. These factors indicate the 
importance of focusing on the protection of economic, social, and cultural rights, 
including the critical need to clarify land tenure for indigenous groups and to protect 
their customary land rights.  
 
In April 2005 the U.N. Commission on Human Rights called upon the Burmese 
government: 
 
(a) To end the systematic violations of human rights in Myanmar, to ensure full 
respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, to end impunity and to 
investigate and bring to justice any perpetrators of human rights violations, 
including members of the military and other government agents in all 
circumstances; 
(b) To end widespread rape and other forms of sexual violence persistently 
carried out by members of the armed forces, in particular against women 
belonging to ethnic minorities, and to investigate and bring to justice any 
perpetrators in order to end impunity for these acts; 
(c) To end the systematic enforced displacement of persons and other causes of 
refugee flows to neighboring countries, to provide the necessary protection and 
assistance to internally displaced persons, in cooperation with the international 
        13        HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO. 4 (C) 
community, and to respect the right of refugees to voluntary, safe and dignified 
return monitored by appropriate international agencies.8 
 
Human Rights Watch urges the military government in Rangoon to implement these 
recommendations immediately. It must issue orders to its troops to end all attacks on 
civilians. In addition to constituting serious human rights abuses, these attacks 
undermine any hopes the SPDC may have of reaching a political settlement with 
representatives of Karen communities. To address the internal displacement problem in 
Karen areas, Human Rights Watch also urges: 
 
• All parties to the conflict to allow greater international access to conflict areas to 
provide humanitarian assistance and protection to IDPs. Landmine mapping 
and clearance is a particularly urgent unmet need. International and local 
agencies should employ protection staff and provide protection training to all 
other field staff, and offer such training to all appropriate government officials.  
• The development and implementation of policies regarding individual and 
community land rights and access to land in Burma, including restitution of, or 
compensation for, property confiscated, stolen, or illegally occupied, and respect 
for customary rights to land. 
• Emphasis on the principle that every solution should be voluntarily chosen 
through the informed consent of the displaced individual, whether that solution 
be integration, relocation, or return home.  
• That the provision of humanitarian and development assistance is not misused 
by the government and the Tatmadaw to further military objectives in conflict-
affected, often traditionally semi-autonomous, areas. It is critical that 
international agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) should be able to function independently without 
unnecessary restrictions. 
• Donors to work with local NGOs and rights-respecting local government 
officials and ceasefire groups to provide services, such as formal and informal 
education, vocational and skills training and materials, health services, including 
training of medics, micro-credit programs, natural resource management and 
environmental protection.  
• The provision of aid and assistance through civil society groups and networks, 
many of which are operational in areas inaccessible to international agencies. 
                                                   
8 United Nation Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights (Sixty-first session, Agenda item 
9), “Question of the violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms In Any Part Of The World - Situation 
of human rights in Myanmar” (E/CN.4/2005/L April 29, 2005). 
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Building the capacity of such groups must be a priority. Donors should foster 
the emergence of under-represented groups, such as non-Christians, minorities 
within Karen State, and women, and should not concentrate all resources on a 
narrow set of professional and westernized NGOs. Genuine partnership and 
joint ownership of projects with civil society actors should be encouraged. 
Needs and vulnerability assessments should mainstream conflict resolution, 
protection and gender issues, and highlight policies that effectively address the 
needs of the poor. Both the SPDC and KNU must be persuaded to let these 
processes take place, even if they do not like the outcome.  
 
A more detailed set of recommendations can be found in Section VII at the end of this 
report.  
 
II. Background 
 
Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD, and the SPDC’s failed national dialogue 
After a quarter-century of one-party military rule, hundreds of thousands of student and 
other demonstrators took to the streets across Burma in 1988, calling for democracy and 
the rule of law. The ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) brutally 
crushed the movement, killing thousands of civilians. Over the next few years, the 
SLORC further consolidated its control, establishing its own mass organizations. 
However, despite severe restrictions on freedom of speech, association, and assembly, 
many brave individuals and groups have continued to speak out and work for democracy 
and development at both the community and national levels.  
 
In a reaction to widespread protests, the SLORC held elections in May 1990. The highly 
popular and outspoken Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been placed under house arrest in 
1989, and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won 82 percent of the 
seats. However, the generals refused to allow the NLD and its allies to form a 
government, instead imprisoning several hundred more political opponents the 
following year. Since that time, the junta has insisted on maintaining military rule, 
changing only its name in 1997 to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). 
Since its refusal to recognize the results of the May 1990 election, the military 
government has resisted all options but a managed transition––by the military–– to a 
vaguely described military-led “democracy.” 
 
Despite winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 for her nonviolent resistance to the 
government, Aung San Suu Kyi has been in and out of house arrest since 1989. Many 
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NLD leaders and party activists have also spent a great deal of time arbitrarily detained 
under house arrest or imprisoned under horrendous conditions. In the mid-1990s, and 
again in May 2003, Suu Kyi was briefly released, but her efforts to peacefully mobilize 
supporters were met again with violent military suppression when on May 30, 2003, an 
SPDC-organized mob at Depayin killed at least four of her bodyguards and possibly 
dozens of onlookers.  
 
For decades across Burma, human rights abuses, many of them committed by the 
Burmese army, or Tatmadaw, have been rampant. Common tools of state control include 
torture, rape, and forced conscription of child soldiers. By mid-November 2004 there 
were more than 1,400 political prisoners in Burma, and although the SPDC announced 
at the same time it would release 3,937 prisoners, including a handful of prominent 
political prisoners, there has been no commensurate political liberalization. 
 
In August 2003, Burma’s newly appointed Prime Minister and Chief of Military 
Intelligence, General Khin Nyunt, announced a reconvening of the National Convention 
(NC) to draft a new constitution, one of seven steps in the government’s “roadmap to 
democracy.”9 Although this process was clearly dominated by the military, it was 
effectively the only national-level discussion about about instituting a democratically 
elected government and dealing with the concerns of Burma’s many ethnic groups. Yet, 
three days before the National Convention reconvened, Burma’s two main opposition 
parties announced that they would not join the convention. The government had failed 
to meet demands to release Suu Kyi and reopen NLD offices across the country, or to 
demonstrate to the NLD and the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA), a coalition of 
ethnic nationality parties elected in 1990, that it would permit genuine debate over key 
issues. The National Convention has therefore been widely perceived as illegitimate, 
both inside Burma and abroad.  
 
Internal divisions within the SPDC boiled over when on October 19, 2004, Khin 
Nyunt––regarded as the second or third most powerful person in the country––was 
arrested. The fall of Khin Nyunt was preceded and accompanied by the closing down of 
his powerful military intelligence apparatus and the arrest of many of his associates. Khin 
Nyunt was replaced as prime minister by Lt-General Soe Win, the man responsible for 
orchestrating the attack on Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade at Depayin on May 30, 2003.  
 
                                                   
9 Burma has had two previous constitutions, promulgated in 1947 (before independence in 1948) and in 1974 
(by the Ne Win regime). First called in 1993, the National Convention had been suspended since 1996. 
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To most observers, these events signaled the consolidation of power by the hard-line 
junta Chairman and Vice-Chairman, Generals Than Shwe and General Maung Aye. The 
government was careful to portray the move as a change of personnel, rather than of 
policy. A week later, Than Shwe made the first trip by a Burmese head of state to India 
in more than twenty years. With continued political and economic support from China 
and an ever-close relationship with India, the generals remained in a strong position to 
try to ride out western sanctions and any unease among its Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) partners. 
  
Fifty years of ethnic conflict 
While the world’s attention has been focused on national-level politics and the fate of 
Aung San Suu Kyi, much less attention has been paid to the highly complex and brutal 
abuses of ethnic minorities in more remote parts of the country. The situation is 
particularly acute in areas of ongoing armed conflict. 
 
Ethnic minorities constitute at least 35 percent, or eighteen million, of Burma’s 
estimated fifty-two million people. Historically, the “ethnic question” has been at the 
heart of Burma’s protracted political, social and humanitarian crises. Ethnic insurgent 
armies have operated along Burma’s borders for decades in several areas since 
independence in 1948. However, by the early 1980s, the Tatmadaw had gained the upper 
hand against the ethnic rebels, and the areas under their control began to shrink. 
Increasing numbers of civilians became displaced by the fighting in eastern and northern 
Burma, and were no longer able to retreat to relative safety behind the “front lines” of 
the conflict and rebuild their villages. Instead, many had to flee across the border to 
Thailand, China, India, or Bangladesh. 
 
Much recent political science literature has focused on the “opportunity motives” for 
insurgency. However, Burma’s rebellions have long been driven by a mixture of genuine 
grievances and political-military-economic opportunism. Especially following the 
military take-over by General Ne Win in 1962, ethnic nationality elites have been 
excluded from meaningful participation in politics, while minority-populated border 
areas have experienced chronic underdevelopment, combined with often unsustainable 
natural resource extraction. Meanwhile, in its largely successful campaigns against a 
myriad of ethnic and communist insurgent organizations, the SPDC and its precursors 
have extended militarized control into previously semi-autonomous border areas, 
causing massive social, economic and human disruption––and greatly weakening the 
armed opposition.  
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Every Burmese regime since the establishment of military rule in 1962 has sought to 
suppress ethnic minorities and bring previously insurgent-dominated border areas under 
Rangoon’s control. The strategy has had military and ethnic dimensions: not only would 
ethnic minority communities be broken up and their ability to resist weakened, but it 
would also allow for the spread of state-sponsored “Burmanization,” in which minority 
cultures, histories, and political aspirations would be eliminated in favor of a “national” 
identity. The Burmese regimes in essence view all ethnic minorities as a potential security 
threat10, and, as a result, have “allowed security issues to come to dominate all aspects of 
government policymaking.”11  
 
The Tatmadaw’s often brutal counter-insurgency strategies set the tone for coercive 
methods of dealing with dissent––whether armed revolt, nonviolent political dissent, or 
apolitical civilians––over the following decades.12 The Tatmadaw’s “Four Cuts” (pya ley 
pya) counter-insurgency strategy, used since 1963, best embodies the state’s approach to 
suppressing ethnic minorities. A rebel group has been fully “cut” if it no longer has 
access to new recruits, intelligence, food, or finances. This approach aims to transform 
“black” (rebel-held) areas into “brown” (contested/free fire) areas, and then into 
“white” (government-held) areas.  
 
In response, ethnic insurgent groups have positioned themselves as the defenders of 
minority populations, adopting guerrilla-style tactics. This has invited retaliation against 
the civilian population, against which the insurgents have been unable to defend 
villagers. As a result, rural Burma has now essentially been engaged in a half century of 
chronic, low-grade warfare. Human rights abuses are rife, most notably torture in 
detention and rape, and the conflict has further deepened the poverty of an already poor 
population. Traditional ways of life have been destroyed.  
 
                                                   
10 In May 1999, the Ministry of Information published a Declaration of Defense Policy, which underlined the 
leadership role of the Tatmadaw in opposing “those…holding negative views…and…all destructive elements.” 
As cited in: Maung Aung Myoe, Military Doctrine and Strategy in Myanmar: A Historical Perspective, (ANU 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper 339; 1999), p. 18. The ‘Three National Causes’ were 
announced as the basis of SLORC rule in September 1988: ibid. pp. 3-14. 
11 Burma Ethnic Research Group (BERG), “Internal Displacement in Burma,” in Disasters Vol. 24, September 
2002, p. 236. 
12 As Mary Callahan observes, at least until 1988, “the displacement and killing of citizen’s of Burma’s frontier 
regions occurred mostly off the radar screen of the population residing in central regions”. [To this day, the 
inhabitants of central Burma remain largely unaware of the systematic abuses perpetrated in their name by the 
Tatmadaw in border regions; the same might also be said of some foreign observers, whose experience of the 
country is restricted to firmly government-controlled areas]: Mary Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State 
Building in Burma (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 223. 
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In order to undermine perceived support for armed ethnic or communist groups, since 
the 1960s the military government and Tatmadaw have created well over a million IDPs 
by forcibly moving thousands of ethnic nationality villages across the country. IDPs are 
highly vulnerable to Tatmadaw abuses and have serious difficulty maintaining livelihoods. 
Even after conflict has died down, many are unable to return to their previous farms and 
settlements, due to the prevalence of landmines and confiscation of land or other 
resources. Plans for massive infrastructure projects in border areas––including dams and 
new roads––will also prevent the resettlement of IDPs and repatriation of refugees. 
 
Ethnic nationality groups have sought to advance their agenda politically as well as 
militarily. Although most of the 1,076 delegates to the 2003 National Convention were 
handpicked by the SPDC, they included over one hundred representatives from armed 
ethnic nationality groups that have concluded ceasefire agreements with Rangoon, such 
as the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and New Mon State Party (NMSP). 
Despite their reservations about the process, most groups apparently attended the 
convention in good faith in the hope of registering their aspirations on the national 
political agenda and using the ceasefire agreements to address some of the key issues 
that have caused armed conflict in Burma for over five decades.  
 
Although demands varied to some extent, there was general agreement among them to 
press for granting states more authority, transforming ceasefire armies into local security 
forces, and, most importantly, establishing a federal union of Burma, under the rubric of 
“ethnic or national democracy.” In expressing their concerns on the national political 
stage, ethnic groups have made it harder for the international community, while pursuing 
the resolution of political issues in Rangoon, namely the restoration of multiparty 
democracy in Burma, to ignore the “ethnic question.”  
 
However, the convention’s Convening Work Committee refused to put the proposals of 
the ethnic groups on the agenda, claiming they fell outside the National Convention’s 
current remit.13 The ceasefire groups were told that their proposal would be submitted 
directly to the Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt, yet his ouster in October 2004 
means that the proposals remain in limbo.  
 
The National Convention did not reconvene until February 17, 2005. It did so without 
the NLD and the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) ceasefire group, which boycotted the 
convention following the arrest of several Shan leaders in early February. These included 
                                                   
13 Chief Justice U Aung Toe, the head of the Committee, reminded the groups that the 2003 NC’s function was 
to conclude the work suspended in 1993, and to promulgate the regime’s 6 principles and 104 proposals.  
        19        HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO. 4 (C) 
Khun Htun Oo and Sai Nyunt Lwin, Chairman and General Secretary of the Shan 
Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), the party with the second largest number 
of MPs-elect from 1990. The Shan leaders were detained following a meeting in 
Taunggyi (southern Shan State) on February 7, where plans were discussed to form a 
stronger coalition between Shan State ceasefire groups and the 1990 parties, who were 
not at the convention.14 
 
On February 13, six ceasefire groups issued a statement, repeating their demands of the 
previous year and calling for a review of the draft constitution’s Principle No. 6, which 
provides that the military will continue to play a leading role in politics. They also asked 
for non-ceasefire groups to be allowed observer status at the convention, to allow 
disagreements and debate, and for the convention minutes to record such dissenting 
voices. Upon arrival, delegates to the convention were cut off from each other and from 
most contact with the outside world.  
 
On March 7, 2005, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan told the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights that: 
 
Most regrettably, it…remains the Secretary-General’s view that the 
National Convention, in its present format, does not adhere to the 
recommendations made by the General Assembly in successive 
resolutions.  
 
He thus reiterates his call on the Myanmar authorities, even at this late 
stage, to take the necessary steps to make the roadmap process more 
inclusive and credible. The Secretary-General also encourages the 
authorities to ensure that the third phase of the roadmap, the drafting of 
the constitution, is fully inclusive. A national referendum will be held 
after that. It is his considered view that unless this poll adheres to 
internationally accepted standards of conduct and participation, it may 
be difficult for the international community, including the countries of 
the region, to endorse the result.15 
 
                                                   
14 Nandar Chann, “Divide or Rule,” The Irrawaddy, April 2005 [online], 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a=4584&z=104 (retrieved May 20, 2005).  
15 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sixty-first session, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of 
human rights in Myanmar (E/CN.4/2005/130, March 7, 2005). The report was submitted in furtherance of the 
Secretary-General’s good offices efforts in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 59/263 of December 23, 
2004. 
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In mid-March it was revealed that the National Convention would take another break, 
from mid-April. Some observers interpreted this as a sign of “unsolved problems with 
ethnic ceasefire groups.”16  
 
In late April 2005 a battalion of the Shan State National Army (SSNA) ceasefire group 
was pressured by the SPDC into surrendering its weapons. Many observers viewed this 
as an escalation of the government’s crackdown on Shan opposition groups.17 Then, on 
April 29, another northern Shan State–based ceasefire group, the Palaung State 
Liberation Army (PSLA), was also forced to surrender its weapons. This development 
may indicate that the government is intent on picking off ceasefire groups one-by-one, 
persuading the smaller groups and less well-organized groups to disarm first, before 
moving on to the better established Wa, Kachin, Mon, and other militias.18 In late May 
the SSNA leader, Colonel Sai Yi, took his three remaining battalions back to war with 
Rangoon, merging his forces with the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), which had never 
agreed to a ceasefire.19 This was the first time in a decade that a ceasefire group had 
resumed armed conflict with the military government. 
 
It is an open secret that the Thai government is pressuring the KNU to sign an 
agreement with Rangoon because it wants to be rid of the 140,000 mostly Karen 
refugees in the kingdom and is keen to exploit the economic opportunities that peace 
may bring to its borders. KNU negotiators have emphasized the extent of the 
displacement crisis in Burma, and suggested that the plight of IDPs be addressed before 
any refugee repatriation is undertaken. Most aid workers and diplomats agree that the 
time is not yet right to begin sending refugees back from Thailand.  
 
The Karen 
Despite the limited opportunities for community development and peace-building 
represented by the ceasefires in conflict-related areas, much of Karen and Karenni 
States, southern Shan State, and Tenasserim Division––in the east and southeast of 
Burma––are still affected by low-level armed conflict. For the civilian victims of civil 
war, the situation remains dire. 
 
                                                   
16 The Irrawaddy, March 21, 2005. 
17 “Shan rebels hand over arms to Myanmar military,” Deutsche Presse, April 14, 2005; “Another ethnic 
ceasefire group to disarm,” The Irrawaddy, April 28, 2005.  
18 Human Rights Watch interview, May 10, 2005. Since late 2004, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army 
(DKBA), the main Karen ceasefire group, has also come under pressure to disarm. 
19 “Col Sai Yi: Ceasefire pact torn down by Rangoon,” The Irrawaddy, May 23, 2005.  
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The five to seven million Karen in Burma and approximately 350,000 Karen in Thailand 
speak twelve mutually unintelligible, but related, dialects. Between 80-85 percent of 
Karen are either S’ghaw (mostly Christian and animist living in the hills) or Pwo (mostly 
lowland Buddhists). About 25-30 percent are Christian, 5-10 percent are animist, and the 
rest are Buddhist. An estimated 30 percent of Karen people live in urban settings and 70 
percent in rural areas. About 40 percent are plains dwellers and 60 percent live in the 
hills.20  
 
As demarcated by the government, Karen State consists of seven townships (Pa’an, 
Kawkareik, Kya-In Seik-Gyi, Myawaddy, Papun, Thandaung and Hlaingbwe), with a 
population in 1995 of approximately 1.3 million.21 The percentage of Karen living in 
Karen State has decreased considerably due to the outflow to Thailand.  
 
Rejecting the government’s administrative boundaries, the KNU has organized the 
Karen “free state” of Kaw Thoo Lei22 into seven districts, each of which corresponds to 
a Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) brigade area.23 The districts are divided into 
twenty-eight townships and then into groups of villages administered as a unit by the 
KNU––that is, in areas where the KNU still exercises some influence. This civilian 
structure is paralleled by an often more extensive KNLA military administration.  
 
The majority of the Karen live in Tenasserim Division (KNU Mergui-Tavoy District), 
eastern Pegu (or Bago) Division (which overlaps with Nyaunglebin District), Mon State 
(which overlaps with parts of Duplaya and Thaton Districts), and the Irrawaddy 
Division, areas that are mostly government-controlled.24 Neither the government nor the 
KNU has ever conducted a reliable population survey. However, a report issued in 1998 
estimated the population of Kaw Thoo Lei at between 2-2.4 million people, or about 
half the Karen population of Burma.25 
                                                   
20 Burma Ethnic Research Group (BERG), Forgotten Victims of a Hidden War: Internally Displaced Karen in 
Burma (Chiang Mai April 1998), p. 34. 
21 Ibid. p. 8. 
22 Kaw Thoo Lei may be translated as either ‘the land burned black’ (by ‘slash-and-burn’ farming, or by warfare), 
‘the pure land,’ or ‘the land of the thoo lei plant’ (i.e. ‘flowerland’). 
23 Brigade 1 – Thaton District, Brigade 2—Taungoo District, Brigade 3 – Nyaunglebin (or Kler Lwee Htoo) 
District, Brigade 4 – Mergui-Tavoy District, Brigade 5 – Papun (or Mudraw) District, Brigade 6 – Duplaya 
District, Brigade 7 – Pa’an District. In addition, the KNLA deploys a number of Special Battalions, based in 
economically important border areas, and personally loyal to the family of General Bo Mya. 
24 The Burmese government’s territorial administration divides the country into seven predominantly ethnic-
nationality populated States and seven mainly Burman-populated Divisions. The KNU administration divides 
Kaw Thoo Lei (which roughly overlaps with Karen State and Tenasserim Division) into seven Districts, each of 
which is composed of a number of Townships. 
25 Burma Ethnic Research Group (BERG), Forgotten Victims of a Hidden War, p. 11. 
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The Karen have been subject to repeated displacement. For example, following the 
introduction of the “Four Cuts” in 1974-5, approximately forty-three villages in the 
Nyaunglebin District were forcibly relocated at least twice.26 According to the highly 
respected Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), there were eighteen thousand 
IDPs in eastern Pegu Division in mid-2004, while a community-based organization 
working inside Burma reported as many as 29,807 people displaced in the same area at 
government-controlled sites alone. Similarly, in Papun District, a “Four Cuts” operation 
beginning in the mid-1970s displaced an estimated fifty thousand people.27 Further 
Tatmadaw operations caused about nine thousand refugees to flee to Thailand in 1996 
alone.28  
 
Although Karen nationalists have resisted Rangoon’s domination for more than fifty 
years, their internal divisions have been equally persistent, making it difficult to articulate 
a unified position on behalf of the entire nationality group. It has also been easier for the 
military government in Rangoon to “divide and conquer” the Karen.  
 
Like most ethnic insurgent groups, the KNU has claimed to be fighting for democracy 
in Burma––especially since the great 1988 “democracy uprising.” Although the KNU 
retains a sometimes contested legitimacy in many Karen communities, the democratic 
ideal has not always been honored in practice, and the liberated zones have often been 
characterized by a top-down tributary political system, aspects of which recall pre-
colonial forms of socio-political organization.  
 
After a series of military setbacks, dating back to the 1970s, and with greatly diminished 
support from the Thai government and army, the KNU today is a greatly weakened 
force. The KNLA still has some five thousand-seven thousand soldiers, but it no longer 
represents a significant military threat to the SPDC.29 However, the KNU’s longevity 
                                                   
26 Earth Rights International (ERI) and Karen Environment and Social Action Network (KESAN), Capitalizing on 
Conflict: How Logging and Mining Contribute to Environmental Destruction in Burma (October 2003), pp. 26-34. 
27 Burma Ethnic Research Group (BERG), Forgotten Victims of a Hidden War, p. 28. 
28 In 1998 BERG estimated that 69 percent of the populations of Papun and Thaton Districts were IDPs. Papun 
District reportedly contained the largest number of IDPs in Kaw Thoo Lei: forty thousand people: Burma Ethnic 
Research Group (BERG), Forgotten Victims of a Hidden War, p. 32 & 35; see also CIDKP (December 2000), 
which estimated that there were 37,007 IDPs in the district, in 2000. Of these, some 16,877 people (2,890 
families) were so short of food supplies that they were reduced to eating only rice soup (rather than boiled rice).  
29 These soldiers are deployed in seven brigades, including mobile battalions and village militia, and well over a 
thousand active political cadres, including youth and women’s wings. About eight hundred regular KNLA troops 
operate in the Third and Fifth Brigade areas. The KNLA has a uniform code of conduct for its soldiers, 
organizational and rank structure adapted from British army principles, visible and standard insignia, and 
common and clearly identifiable uniforms that easily differentiate its solders from the civilian population.  
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alone brings it considerable credibility among the wider Burmese opposition. It is also 
still considered a key player by elements within the SPDC.  
 
Like other insurgent organizations in Burma, the KNU has an interest in controlling, or 
at least maintaining, populations in traditionally Karen lands––as a source of legitimacy, 
and of food, intelligence, volunteer soldiers, and porters. KNLA soldiers regularly 
organize village evacuations to protect villagers from Tatmadaw incursions.30 However, 
cases of KNLA soldiers purposefully targeting civilians are rare. Since the provisional 
ceasefire in 2003 there has been virtually no displacement as a result of KNLA offensive 
operations.  
 
In an incident that has undermined intra-Karen relations along the border for a decade, 
disaffected Buddhist Pwo-speaking KNLA soldiers who felt excluded by the dominant 
Christian S’ghaw-speaking KNU elite broke from the mainstream Karen insurgent group 
in December 1994. The establishment of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization 
(DKBO) and Army (DKBA) in December 1994, which may have taken place with 
encouragement from local Tatmadaw units, also reflected legitimate grievances among the 
KNU rank-and-file regarding the Christian-dominated organization’s alleged 
discrimination against the Buddhist majority in Kaw Thoo Lei.  
 
The emergence of the DKBA consolidated a major split in the Karen insurgent ranks. 
The DKBA command-and-control structure is weak, and many of these units enjoy 
almost complete autonomy, and/or answer to local Tatmadaw commanders. DKBA 
troop strength is difficult to gauge. Informed sources suggest that the number of active 
soldiers is about three thousand-four thousand. It currently fields three brigades.31  
                                                   
30 This report documents human rights violations leading to internal displacement. It does not attempt to 
document all abuses by government forces or armed ethic groups. It should be noted that in the past the KNLA 
has carried out well-documented human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings and extortion and has 
been involved in the illegal logging trade that affects the civilian population. There continue to be some reports 
of forced labor. Villagers taken as porters for the KNLA reportedly worked without payment, but sometimes 
received rice from other villagers. Villagers were usually required to work for a day or two. While some Karen 
justified such human rights abuses in the name of solidarity with the struggle against the SPDC––“They are our 
Karen people and protect us” is a common sentiment expressed––other Karen interviewees expressed anger at 
the KNLA’s forced conscription of porters and soldiers. 
31 The DKBA currently fields three brigades: 333 Brigade in Thaton District, Nyaunglebin District and Southwest 
Papun District; 555 Brigade in northern Pa'an District; and 999 Brigade in Pa'an District (including the 999 
Special Battalion, led by Maung Chit Thu); plus the 160-man Ka Sah Wah Battalion (previously 777 Brigade) in 
southeast Papun district (Dweh Lo and Bu Tho townships). There are also several units directly controlled by 
the DKBA leadership in Myaing Gyi Ngu (central Pa’an District), including battalions in the Ye-Three Pagodas 
Pass area, and the Phalu-Waley area of Duplaya District. DKBA 999 Special Battalion “has been pursuing … 
conscription campaign. Each village in Ta Greh township is required to provide one person each year… The 
DKBA have told the villagers, ‘If you can’t give money, you have to give people. If you can’t give any of this, we 
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The DKBA often acts as a proxy militia army for the Tatmadaw, deflecting some criticism 
for the state’s harsh policies. Like the Tatmadaw, it uses displacement as a means of 
controlling populations and resources and undermining its rivals. Between 1995-98 it 
instigated at least twelve major attacks on KNU-controlled refugee camps in Thailand, 
killing more than twenty people,32 and it has launched attacks on KNLA positions 
following the announcement of a provisional KNU-SPDC ceasefire. In addition, many 
DKBA commanders and soldiers must be considered conflict entrepreneurs who have 
been personally empowered and enriched as a result of the fighting.  
 
Since the fall from power in October 2004 of General Khin Nyunt, a number of militias 
have come under pressure to hand over their arms to the government. Several DKBA 
units in particular are under pressure to surrender to the Tatmadaw. As result a number 
of Karen soldiers have returned to the KNU in 2005.33 In late May, reports emerged that 
DKBA units were beginning to withdraw from parts of northern Karen State, including 
Nyaunglebin District, and being replaced by the Tatmadaw. 
 
Ceasefires 
Until 1989, the Tatmadaw had been fighting two interconnected civil wars: one against 
the ethnic nationalist insurgents, and another against the Communist Party of Burma 
(CPB). The CPB collapsed in early 1989 and disintegrated into four ethnic militias, 
which quickly agreed to ceasefires with Rangoon. 
 
Since 1989, ceasefire arrangements have been made with some twenty-eight armed 
ethnic nationality groups. The nature of the ceasefire agreements are not uniform, 
although in all cases the ex-insurgents have retained their arms and still control 
sometimes extensive blocks of territory (in recognition of the military situation on the 
ground). The ceasefires are not peace treaties, and generally lack all but the most 
rudimentary accommodation of the ex-insurgents’ political and developmental demands. 
These agreements have been dismissed by some as benefiting vested interests in the 
military regime and insurgent hierarchies. Civilians in these ‘ceasefire areas’ still 
experience a wide range of problems.  
 
However, in many cases there is also something of a peace dividend from the ceasefires. 
Human rights abuses, displacement, and livelihood issues are considerably less acute in 
                                                                                                                                           
will come to your village and we will force you to do whatever labor we want”: Karen Human Rights Group 
(KHRG), March 3, 2004, #2004-U1.  
32 Images Asia, A Question of Security (Chiang Mai 1998).  
33 Human Rights Watch interview, May 6, 2005. 
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ceasefire areas, so much so that the TBBC reports that the IDP population in those 
areas has increased, as IDPs move out of war zones and into ceasefire zones. While 
many violations continue, such as forced labor, land confiscation, and arbitrary taxation, 
in areas where ceasefires have held serious violations against the integrity of the person, 
such as extrajudicial killings and torture, have decreased.34 This pattern is already 
emerging in post-armed conflict Karen areas. 
 
The variable vulnerability to abuse is illustrated by the TBBC’s October 2004 report on 
“Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma.” The report stated that “the 
internally displaced population in ceasefire areas has increased by between 20-30 percent 
during the past two years,” as IDPs in hiding move to relatively more secure areas.35 A 
range of indicators show that conditions for IDPs in ceasefire areas are significantly 
better than in free-fire zones or relocation sites. Reports of human rights abuses (with 
the exception of forced labor and local “taxes,” which are extracted by ceasefire groups) 
are lower in ceasefire areas than in free-fire areas, partial/mixed administration areas or 
relocation sites.36 People in ceasefire areas are reportedly less likely to be forcibly 
displaced (on average, 0.2 times/year) than those in free-fire areas (1.4 times), 
partial/mixed administration areas (0.3 times), or relocation sites (1 time), and are also 
less likely to become casualties of war (0.2 percent, compared to a range in other 
situations of between 0.3-2.2 percent).37 
 
One crucial but largely unrecognized benefit of the ceasefire process is the rise of 
community-based organizations (CBOs). These not only address humanitarian and 
developmental needs, but also make it possible to debate and articulate their 
communities’ specific concerns. Whether the ceasefire process can be sustained, and 
move from the current negative peace––characterized by a significant decrease in armed 
conflict––into a positive, peace-building phase, will be fundamental to the success of 
reconstruction and national reconciliation efforts.  
 
In this climate of risk and uncertainty, the KNU, Burma’s most significant remaining 
insurgent group, has been attempting to negotiate a ceasefire with Rangoon. On 
December 10, 2003, the KNU announced a “gentlemen’s agreement” to stop fighting, 
                                                   
34 Field Notes, February 22 and 25, 2005. 
35 Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma 
(October 2004), p. 22. 
36 Ibid. p. 75. 
37 People in Ceasefire Areas are more likely to cultivate paddy fields (49 percent) – as opposed to less food – 
secure swidden cultivation - than those in Free-fire Areas (14 percent), Partial/Mixed Administration Areas (32 
percent) or Relocation Sites (27 percent); they also have better access to education (but not to health) services: 
ibid pp. 76-80. 
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shortly after an exploratory meeting in Rangoon between military intelligence officers 
and a team selected by KNU Vice-Chairman General Bo Mya. These were the first 
KNU-government contacts since 1995-96.  
 
Following the announcement, both the KNU and SPDC ordered their military units to 
cease offensive operations. However, the Tatmadaw subsequently repeatedly violated the 
agreement. Talks continued in Rangoon in mid-January and in Moulmein in February.38 
These yielded a vague “agreement in principle,” with specifics to be discussed over the 
coming year. The KNU pressed to establish concrete mechanisms to address human 
rights and other ceasefire violations, and to discuss the urgent needs of IDPs and other 
conflict-affected civilians.  
 
During the January 2004 talks, a military government representative for the first time 
admitted that the Tatmadaw had engaged in extensive population relocations, as part of 
its counter-insurgent strategy. He also accepted that, with an end to the fighting, these 
people might be able to go home, and receive appropriate assistance.39 But the next 
round of talks was delayed for several months, following an incident on February 23 in 
which KNLA 3rd Brigade troops attacked a Tatmadaw camp in western Nyaunglebin 
District, killing several soldiers and liberating weapons and some communications 
equipment. Although the KNLA returned the seized material, the SPDC used this 
ceasefire violation as a ground to further delay talks.  
 
In March 2004 Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, the United Nations “Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights in Myanmar,” stated that: 
 
Among other related positive developments, the most notable is the 
resumption of peace talks between the Government and the largest 
armed opposition group, the Karen National Union. Were human rights 
commitments to be built into an agreement, this process could 
significantly improve not only the human rights situation in ethnic 
minority areas, but also the political climate throughout Burma.40 
 
                                                   
38 At the January talks the KNU was represented by General Bo Mya. In February, it was represented by Joint 
Secretary Lt-Col Htoo Htoo Lay and foreign affairs chief David Taw. 
39 Human Rights Watch interviews with KNU officials in Bangkok and Mae Sot, September 9, 2004 and October 
2-7, 2004.  
40 Oral Statement by Mr. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burma, 
60th Session of the Commission on Human Rights (Geneva, March 26, 2004). 
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The next few months will determine whether or not a KNU-SPDC ceasefire will be 
achieved and deliver a substantial improvement in the human rights situation, creating 
the space in which local and international organizations can begin to address the urgent 
needs of Karen villagers.  
 
The Monk’s Story41 
 
I was born at Hgaw Klar. My parents were ‘slash and burn’ farmers. Then we moved to Paw Mu 
Lah Hta, and stayed for three years. There was no school and no hospital. If we got sick, we had 
to buy medicines at nearby Mae Wai. After three years we returned to Hgaw Klar, to do irrigated 
paddy cultivation. My mother died, and one year later my father got married again. By that time I 
was five years old. 
 
Then we moved to Pau War Der, to do ‘slash and burn’ cultivation again. We also got income 
from dock-fruits. There was a school, which went up to fourth standard. 
 
In 1978-78, when I was twenty-one years old, Tatmadaw Infantry Battalion No. 30 undertook 
military operations in the area. While we were fleeing to Ta Kaw Khi, one man was shot and 
wounded. We had no western medicine, so we used traditional cures. He recovered from the 
wound, but later got a high fever and died. He was fifty years old. During that military operation 
many people were killed in the area. 
 
In June 1997 we were captured by the Tatmadaw. We were taken back to Shwe Kyin town, where 
we were kept at Klaw Maw Kho [relocation site]. There was no school, but there was a small 
hospital. Two villagers from Ga Lay Der died there. After two years, I fled and came back to Ner 
Khi. Then, because the Tatmadaw attacked in 2002, I fled into Htee Kho Khi, in the jungle. After 
one year, I moved to Thwa Hta.  
 
My present monastery is made of bamboo. The daka [Buddhist villagers who donate to the 
monks] give me food, such as paddy and rice, salt and fish paste. The monastery’s main income 
is rice and paddy, donated together with a little money by the daka, who support our religious 
work. 
 
If we have money we buy medicines, and the daka sometimes donate medicines as well. If the 
illness is not serious, we buy medicine and we drink it at the monastery. I got sick once and went 
to the hospital, where I got malaria medicines. Most sick people in the village have diarrhea and 
vomiting diseases, or a cough with vomited blood, which they say is tuberculosis. These kinds of 
diseases are common.  
 
The village school was established by Kaw Thoo Lei [the KNU] and local a Karen NGO. I think 
that there are enough teachers. They carried back the school materials from the eastern part of 
the state – maybe from [the KNU base at] Day Bu Noh, although I don't know much about this. 
To begin with, when we built the school, it was only first standard; later we extended it up to 
third standard, and later fourth standard. 
 
                                                   
41 Human Rights Watch interview June 2003, conducted at Thwa Hta village, Papun District (comments in 
parenthesis added). 
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The main problem in our area is that the Tatmadaw attack people, and villagers are unable to 
support themselves. They face food shortages, have less money and have health care problems.  
 
For example, Saw Pah Lay was shot and killed by the Tatmadaw while he was harvesting in his 
paddy farm. People kept watch, but the column came by another path, and shot the people who 
were harvesting; only Saw Pah Lay was hit. Another villager, Nay Pwe Moo Pah, trod on a 
landmine and was killed. Battles took place in the area more than ten times.  
 
III. Human Rights Abuses of the Karen 
 
In this country, order is the law. Everybody in Burma knows that if you make just 
one mistake––in word or deed––you’ll end up in jail.42  
 
Human rights and humanitarian law violations in Karen state 
The consequences of the “mistake” of being perceived as an opponent of the SPDC in 
majority Burman areas of the country have been well documented. But until recently, 
less attention has focused on widespread human rights violations in ethnic nationality 
areas of Burma, particularly those inhabited by the Karen. This section documents 
ethnicity-based persecution by Tatmadaw military assaults on the civilian population, 
including killings, rape, forced labor, and repeated displacement.  
 
International humanitarian law prohibits acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose 
of which is to spread terror among the civilian population.43 All sides in the ongoing 
armed conflicts in Burma are bound by international humanitarian law (the laws of war). 
Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which Burma ratified in 1992, the conflict with 
the KNLA is considered a non-international (internal) armed conflict. During an internal 
armed conflict, government armed forces and their proxy forces and armed opposition 
groups must abide by Common Article III to the Geneva Conventions as well as 
customary international humanitarian law. Common Article III as well as international 
human rights law prohibits the murder, torture or other mistreatment of captured 
combatants and civilians. Customary international humanitarian law further prohibits 
attacks against individual civilians, the civilian population and civilian objects, such as 
homes and temples. Attacks on military targets that cause indiscriminate or 
disproportionate harm to the civilian population are likewise prohibited.44 
                                                   
42: Human Rights Watch interview with Rangoon taxi driver, September 16, 2004. 
43 See Geneva Conventions, Protocol II, Article 13. Most of the provisions of Protocol II, which applies during 
non-international armed conflicts, are considered reflective of customary international law. 
44 Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3: Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War Common, August 12, 1949. See also Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary 
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The Tatmadaw has committed atrocities with the apparent aim to instill fear in the civilian 
population for several decades. It has attempted to maintain control throughout Karen 
areas by brutalizing the civilian population. Echoing the logic of the “Four Cuts,” 
military officials defend their actions as necessary in the prosecution of a protracted war 
against rurally based guerillas.45 Over the years, Tatmadaw forces have conducted 
repeated military assaults against ethnic minority villages in which there were no armed 
opposition forces or other apparent military target. Furthermore, upon taking control of 
such villages, Tatmadaw personnel have frequently committed abuses against the 
residents. These atrocities appear designed to instill terror in the civilian population and 
ultimately weaken opposition to the government. 
 
Nearly all witnesses described the Tatmadaw’s attacks as targeting civilians at random and 
without an immediate military objective. H.D.’s story encompasses many of the 
violations experienced by the Karen. She is a sixty-seven-year-old S’ghaw Karen woman 
who moved to Ka Law Gaw Village on the Thai-Burma border as a settler nine years 
ago. Before that time she claimed that internal displacement was part of her life, and that 
she has moved “over one hundred times.” She has been made to participate in forced 
labor many times in her life. She can speak Burmese as she was once a village leader in 
an SPDC controlled area of Karen State. 
 
Before when I lived in another village, I was a village head. Burmese 
troops treated us very bad and used men as porters and beat some men 
to death. One SPDC officer asked me if SPDC do good work or bad 
work? He wanted to know if I preferred SPDC or KNU? I said I didn’t 
know and that the political situation is still on a journey and we will see–
–whoever takes us to the end is good. I was afraid when I spoke to that 
officer. I cannot count [how many times I have had to do forced labor]. 
I have many times been made to show the way. I am very afraid when I 
have to do this at night. Many times I have been made to carry supplies 
for one day. 
 
One night I stayed in a cave. It was very uncomfortable ground. It 
smelled bad and we were all afraid. The next day I was crawling along 
                                                                                                                                           
International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005) (Ed. ICRC). Under Common Article 
3 to the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law, government forces and opposition 
armed groups must treat civilians and captured combatants humanely. Inhumane treatment includes murder, 
torture and other mistreatment, rape and other sexual violence, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and forced labor.  
45 Robert Taylor, “Government Responses to Armed communist and Separatist Movements: Burma, in 
Chandran Jeshurun,” in Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1985). 
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the ground and I looked up to see a Thai soldier standing in front of me. 
He told me to go back to my village. I told him the SPDC was there, I 
cannot go back. I was afraid of this soldier. Finally he said to come in [to 
Thailand]. The Thai soldiers kept us in the cave for two nights, then they 
took us to the monastery [in Thailand] until today…I only carried my 
granddaughter when I ran. 
 
Another case reported to Human Rights Watch typifies the types of abuses committed: 
 
After I harvest the paddy they come and take it all. I have a little left. 
When the doo-dar [enemy] come into my house I am afraid and think 
they will rape me. They call me moe- moe [“mother-mother”] to show 
respect then take everything. A soldier came into my house and began to 
speak to me, but I cannot understand so I just ignored him. He became 
angry and threatened me with his knife then took the pot of rice I was 
cooking. The soldiers are always suspicious and don’t trust us. They 
always ask where are the Karen soldiers. The Burmese soldiers are bad 
people. I tremble when I see them. I cannot approach [them]. The 
soldiers…gave us nothing…they only took from us.46  
 
H.T., a twenty-eight-year-old Karen from Dooplaya District along the Thai-Burma 
border near Tak Province, is married with one child. He said that on January 10, 2005––
Karen New Year––local SPDC and KNU commanders had worked out a local ceasefire 
so that the New Year celebrations would not be disrupted. When a messenger sent by 
the SPDC from another village arrived with an order for the village head to go to the 
local SPDC column base thirty minutes away, he knew that something was going to 
happen. 
 
The KNU soldiers were in our village celebrating Karen New Year. The 
SPDC got very angry and wanted to come to the village. The village 
head went to negotiate with the SPDC officer five times. The last time 
three monks and a religious teacher also went to talk to the officer so 
that they would not attack. In the village a KNU officer, Ner Dah Mya, 
201 Special Battalion Commanding Officer, spoke to a DKBA officer 
who was with the SPDC soldiers to try and stop the fighting. DKBA 
gave the radio to the SPDC officer but he just shut off the radio. He did 
not want to talk with KNU. Just attack. Twenty – thirty families stayed 
                                                   
46 Human Rights Watch interview with woman at Ler Per Her IDP village, January 8, 2005. 
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on the Karen side on Monday night. Many of them were hiding in a 
cave. The others went to the Thai side. On Tuesday nearly 350 people 
went to the monastery inside Thailand traveling in small groups.47  
 
Given these civilians’ geographical proximity to the Thai border, it is common for them 
to seek shelter from Tatmadaw assaults there. In some cases, the Thai military is helpful 
to them. 
 
N.B., a forty-six-year-old S’ghaw Karen farmer, fled the Tatmadaw into Thailand two 
days before Human Rights Watch interviewed her in January 2005. She spent two nights 
on the borderline in a cave hiding from SPDC soldiers. Thai soldiers let her come into 
Thailand where she spent two nights in a monastery with the rest of the people who had 
fled the fighting. According to N.B., this was the third time in her life she had been 
forced to flee. 
 
We were afraid that SPDC would come. The fighting started on 
Monday, Burmese soldiers came, saw two KNU soldiers and started 
shooting. On Wednesday [January 12, 2005], four people went back to 
the village and SPDC took them. We don’t know what happened to 
them.48 
 
Despite the ongoing ceasefire negotiations between the KNU and the SPDC, abuses of 
Karen civilians have continued. In December 2003 the Tatmadaw launched a major 
offensive against the KNU in northern Lu Thaw township and against the Karenni 
National Progressive Party (KNPP) in southern Karenni (a short-lived SLORC-KNPP 
ceasefire broke down in 1995). Like most post-ceasefire military operations, this 
campaign specifically targeted the civilian population, displacing some 5,500 people, 
from nineteen villages. The Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) documented the 
arrest and summary execution of at least thirty-one civilians in Nyaunglebin District 
during the period of the ceasefire.49 The KHRG reported in September 2004 that 
“villagers have been summarily executed by SPDC columns.”50 There is considerable 
evidence of further abuses, including summary executions, torture, and looting.51 
                                                   
47 Human Rights Watch interview, Thai-Burma border, January 14, 2005.  
48 Human Rights Watch interview, Thai-Burma border, January 14, 2005. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), “Papun and Nyaunglebin Districts: Continued Oppression During the 
Ceasefire,” September 9, 2004, KHRG #2004-U2. 
51 The Free Burma Rangers (FBR) report that on February 26, 2004, Tatmadaw Battalion 264 arrested and 
killed 6 Krow Pu villagers (Mone Township), while they were collecting betel leaves: Saw Moo La (aged twenty-
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Since mid-February 2004, occasional skirmishes have displaced at least two thousand 
civilians around Mawchi in Southwest Karenni State, where no ceasefire has been 
agreed.52  
 
In addition to attacks directed against civilians, the Tatmadaw also represses Karen 
villagers by stealing, extorting, or destroying their personal property. Customary 
international humanitarian law prohibits pillage, the forcible taking of private property, 
and looting. Attacking or destroying objects indispensable to the civilian population, 
such as food supplies or livestock, are also prohibited, unless such objects are being used 
as sustenance solely by enemy forces. Collective punishments against a civilian 
population violate international law.53  
 
Such abuses have been particularly acute since 1998, when Tatmadaw battalions were 
ordered to be self-reliant for food. Since then, the army has been living off the land. 
Such actions only augment poverty, displacement, and resentment. The KHRG has 
reported that during the ceasefire negotiations, “SPDC military units have also continued 
to demand building materials, food, and money from the villagers.  
 
Looting by Burmese troops was a common theme in accounts by the displaced Karen. 
According to a forty-seven-year-old man: 
 
In 2000 my parents went back into the mountains, to tend their betel 
nut trees and rice field. While they were weeding the fields, troops from 
Burma Army Battalion 48 came and shot them, without question. The 
troops took their livestock and belongings, including 90,000 Kyat in 
                                                                                                                                           
eight), Saw Htoo Kyaw Say (aged forty-five), Saw Htoo Wee (aged thirty), Saw Tha Wah (age twenty-two), Saw 
Taw Nay Htoo (aged twenty-two) and Saw Kree Neh (aged twenty-three). On February 27, 2004 (the next day) 
the same Battalion 264 arrested and killed two Sha Kyaw villagers. On February 28, 2004 (the next day), the 
battalion arrested and killed two Pa Koh Koh villagers. On March 5, 2004, Battalion 30 entered T’Paw Lay Kro 
village(Hsaw Htee Township), and burnt down the church and other buildings. The same day, Battalion 589 (or 
598) burnt down M’Kaw Htaw village. On April 29, 2004, Battalion 382 attacked Thaw Nge Der village (Kyauk 
Gyi Township), shooting and killing a villager, Saw Oo Aye (aged twenty-two). The Free Burma Rangers have 
also reported on the extensive use of torture, the destruction of villages, forced labor, and looting by the 
Tatmadaw in Nyaunglebin District in September-October 2004, (FBR Mission in Kler Lwe Htu District 
(Naunglybin District) at Mone Township, September 27-October 16, 2004.  
52 On September 27, 2004, Tatmadaw Battalions 559 and LIB 224 attacked the KNLA No. 203 Special Battalion 
base at Hsaw K’daw Hta (Na Ker Praw) in Tenasserim Division (west of Chumpon, Thailand), killing three 
villagers, and reportedly displacing sixty-two families. Human Rights Watch interview with Karen human rights 
workers, October 17, 2004. 
53 See ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rules 49-52. 
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cash, and burnt their hut. The soldiers also shot and killed three men, 
Saw Tha Pu Loo, Saw Eh Doh Wah, Saw Poh Blay, and injured one.54 
 
Soon after the interview was conducted, Tatmadaw Battalion 264 troops arrested and 
killed the man’s brother while he was harvesting betel.  
 
A fifty-year-old woman, N.L., from the Nyanglebin District told Human Rights Watch 
how “In November 2001, Tatmadaw troops came into Ko Ker village and burnt down all 
the houses. They killed the pigs and chickens, destroyed the rice barns, and looted our 
possessions.”55 
 
According to K.T., the soldiers came every week: 
 
Sometimes the soldiers stayed for two-three days. They ate food, killed 
our livestock, mostly chickens, and drank alcohol. The soldiers just point 
at what they want then take it. 
 
K.T. said that she “walked with my children for one full day to reach the border. I was 
very afraid of landmines but I came anyway.” K.T. told Human Rights Watch that her 
two daughters died soon after she arrived at the borderline, one in Ler Per Her and the 
other one in a clinic at Mae La refugee camp. Her youngest son is seriously ill.  
 
LST is a thirty-year-old S’ghaw Karen woman.56 She is married with six children. Many 
of the people that had lived in Mae Ken village in Eastern Hpa-an District had filtered 
away in the past year to IDP settlements within Karen State or to live in another village. 
Stealing by SPDC soldiers was constant, and they forced villager to perform menial labor 
to support the nearby Tatmadaw base without compensation. She left the village because 
the soldiers had taken almost all her possessions and took away most of her small paddy 
crop yearly.  
 
I dare not stay in the village. The soldiers steal everything from us. We 
cannot do anymore (stay in the village). We leave because of SPDC 
soldiers not Ka Thoo Lei soldiers (KNU). They took away all my 
belongings. 
                                                   
54 Human Rights Watch interview with Karen man, Papun District, December 13, 2003.  
55 Human Rights Watch interview with N.L. at Hor Ker IDP settlement, Papun District, May 2003. 
56 Human Rights Watch interview with LST at Ler Per Her IDP village, Karen State, January 7, 2005 
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LST’s story also demonstrates that such abuses are not only visited on those living in 
villages, but also on those already displaced. She had to leave for the border with her 
family in three groups, as a large group would attract the attention of the army patrols. 
She could also not carry many household goods because it would have alerted the army 
that she was fleeing.  
 
I did not carry pots or blankets when we fled because the SPDC would 
know we were running away. Three times we came across SPDC 
soldiers. I was scared of talking to the soldiers. We could not understand 
[their questions] and just pointed. We tried to tell them we were just 
visiting [another village]. It took me nearly twelve hours to walk here 
with two children. The men [including her husband] came in six hours 
but they had no children [to bring]. 
 
Again, the KHRG notes that, “SPDC officers also continued to enrich themselves 
through … extortion of money during the early part of 2004.” Recent reports from 
Nyaunglebin District indicate that the Tatmadaw has continued to extort cash, goods and 
labor from villagers throughout the period of the ‘ceasefire’. Army units in the area have 
reportedly been ordered to collect 100,000 Kyat per month (approximately U.S.$100) 
from villagers, for a “front line military fund,” of which 80,000 Kyat is reportedly 
transferred to the Tatmadaw Southeast Regional Command headquarters. In total, local 
KNU sources estimate that 10 million Kyat was extorted from villagers in Nyaunglebin 
District, in the first half of 2004.57  
 
Another villager described the events that led her to flee: 
 
In 1997, the Burma Army shot my brother in the bladder. He bled to 
death. Later, in 2002 in Baw Gwa village, Burma Army troops twice 
destroyed our rice barns. The second time, they also burnt our houses 
while we were hiding in the forest. We were so scared. Later, when we 
crept back to the village, we had nothing to eat and nowhere to sleep. 
We were still scared, but also hungry–– and angry too. Now, whenever I 
hear of or see the Burmese soldiers, my heart beats quickly, and I get all 
shaky and nervous.58 
 
                                                   
57 CIDKP/ KNU Nyaunglebin District documents on file at Human Rights Watch, October 2004. 
58 Human Rights Watch interview at Hor Ker IDP settlement, Papun Distric, May 2003. 
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In addition to direct attacks on civilians, Burmese troops often destroy the livelihood of 
the Karen villagers they target, as reflected in many of the accounts above.  
 
A villager explained how she was displaced: 
 
In 1998 Burma Army troops came to Da Baw Kee village, and asked us 
to move all of our rice from jungle hiding places into the centre of the 
village. They said that if we did not obey them, they would burn all our 
rice and houses. When we had finished moving the rice, they burnt 
down all of our houses and rice barns anyway (including the newly 
transported rice too). Then they told us to move to Mae Wai relocation 
village, or to Ko Sh’rot. Some villagers moved as instructed, but others 
fled to the jungle.59 
 
It is clear from the testimony that in many cases Burmese troops were either attempting 
to prevent the Karen villagers from surviving in their villages, or gathering provisions for 
their own needs with total disregard for the civilians.  
 
Forced labor 
Despite repeated denials by the SPDC, the Tatmadaw continues to conscript local 
villagers in Karen areas, including children, to work either as army porters or as unpaid 
laborers. Many villagers told Human Rights Watch that they fled as a result of these 
practices, thus maintaining the cycle of abuse and displacement. In addition, since 
January 2004, the SPDC has also expanded forcible conscription into local militias, 
which must be supported financially by villagers.60  
 
Uncompensated or abusive forced labor is prohibited under international human rights 
and humanitarian law. International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention No. 29, the 
Forced Labor Convention, defines forced or compulsory labor as “all work or service 
which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the 
said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”61 The ILO took the unusual step of 
appointing a Commission of Inquiry to investigate violations of the Convention in 
Burma and in 1998 it issued a comprehensive report that found the government “guilty 
                                                   
59 Human Rights Watch interview at Hor Ker IDP settlement, Papun Distric, May 2003. 
60 CIDKP/ KNU documents on file at Human Rights Watch, October 2003. 
61 Force Labor Convention, art. 1. Burma signed the Forced Labor Convention in 1955. 
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of an international crime that is also, if committed in a widespread or systematic manner, 
a crime against humanity.”62  
 
In October 2004 the TBBC reported that “more than half [57 percent of those surveyed, 
but only 39 percent in Karen State] of internally displaced households have been forced 
to work without compensation and have been extorted cash or property within the last 
year.” Furthermore, 52 percent of those surveyed, but only 39 percent in Karen State, 
had paid illegal taxes over the past year, and 17 percent––9 percent in Karen State––had 
food supplies destroyed.63 CBOs working inside the country also report that forced 
labor––including forced portering and payment of “porter fees”––is a major problem 
for IDPs and others across eastern Burma.64 
 
A young man of nineteen described his abduction and forced labor at the hands of the 
Tatmadaw: 
 
I never saw Karen soldiers in the village; only government troops. We 
faced many problems from the Burma Army. We had to give them 
money, and build bridges and roads for them, all unpaid. One evening, 
in August 2003, my mother sent me to the market…on my way home, I 
was arrested by the Burma Army soldiers, and my arms were tied behind 
my back. They forced me to get into a truck, which already contained 
over one hundred people. That night they took us to Taungoo. In the 
morning they gave us some rice, and then took us to the battalion base 
at Kyauk Gyi [Ler Doh] town. We were put in a building surrounded by 
soldiers, where we spent the night. The next day we had to carry rice up 
the motor road to Mu Then. We eventually arrived at their Ka Pen base, 
where we stayed for three months.  
 
During that time we cut and carried bamboo for the soldiers, and carried 
rocks to build their garrison. We were beaten regularly, and had to do 
lots of very heavy work. We were given very little food, and never any 
medicines. During those three months I saw six people die of illness. I 
myself had malaria, and couldn’t work properly. However, the troops 
said that I was being lazy, and punched me on the face and nose, and 
beat me with a stick on the back of my legs.  
                                                   
62 International Labor Organization, “Forced labor in Myanmar (Burma),” July 2, 1998, para. 528. 
63 Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), Internal Displacement and Vulnerability, pp. 3-4, p. 43 & p. 75. 
64 Confidential documents on file at Human Rights Watch. 
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Although we had been warned not to run, I couldn’t face this existence 
anymore, so I decided to escape. My malaria was so bad that I couldn’t 
do the work they forced us to do, so I had to get away. I collected a little 
rice at night, and then asked permission to go to the lavatory. Then I ran 
and ran, the whole night! Then I ate my rice and drank some stream 
water, had a nap, and then set-off again into the jungle. I was quite sick 
by then, because of the malaria. Also, I had to eat the rice un-cooked, as 
I had no pot and dared not light a fire!65 
 
K.T., a thirty-year-old S’ghaw Karen woman, fled to the border at the end of 2004 
because she could no longer endure forced labor and food shortages. Her village, Mae 
Ken, used to have forty-fifty families, but now there are just a few left. K.T. said that the 
fighting in the area had decreased in the past two years, but forced labor and stealing by 
SPDC soldiers was at the same level. According to K.T., there is a Tatmadaw battalion 
base close to the village, about two hours walk away, although the villagers can see the 
base on top of a hill. The villagers would be used almost every day for forced labor, 
which could mean carrying supplies from the auto road thirty minutes walk from the 
base, or for security along paths, cooking for soldiers, or repairing buildings or structures 
for the soldiers.66 She said they did forced labor, and that she had been taken as a porter 
often when she was young: 
 
All the time, every week. The SPDC change every six months, so we 
help them carry [equipment]. Every day we must cook for them and 
carry water.  
 
LST’s husband and fellow villagers were forced into serving as Tatmadaw porters: 
 
My husband would always hide in the jungle when the SPDC came. 
When they caught him the made him become a porter. He could not 
grow crops or work…All my family has done (portering). In the last year 
two people from my village were taken as porters and stepped on 
landmines. They died. The SPDC did not inform us. We found out from 
other people. 
 
                                                   
65 Human Rights Watch interview at Nyaunglebin District, December 26, 2003. 
66 Human Rights Watch interview at Ler Per Her IDP village, Karen State, January 7, 2005. 
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Another displaced villager cried as he was interviewed: 
 
I was a Burma Army porter so many times that I can’t count. When I 
was a porter, the army gave me very little to eat. We porters were often 
beaten. Some were beaten to death by the soldiers. They tied us porters 
together, so we could not escape, and made us carry heavy loads. 
 
In December 1995, while I was in the front-line as a porter, the Burma 
Army came to my village, Thi P’Yaw Taw, and killed my wife and two 
children. They burnt down my house, and looted all of the household 
and livestock. When I came back to my village, I had nothing to live on. 
I did nothing for a few years, and then in 1997 I remarried, and had 
another child. I moved to another village, but still they used to come and 
take me as a porter. In 2002 the Burma Army again caught me, and I 
had to be their porter. While I was away, the army again entered my 
village and killed my new wife and child. I was nearly mad with my bad 
luck and broken heart.67 
 
According to some interviewees, the only way to avoid portering is to pay a bribe.68 
 
The Burmese military’s use of forced labor and porters causes harm well beyond that 
suffered by those directly involved. This practice of forced labor contravenes 
international law and has various serious side-effects, such as a reduction in family 
productivity and a concomitant inability to pay taxes and other fees, leaving those 
involved at further risk of forced labor.  
 
In addition, as Karen men escaped their villages to avoid forced labor, they often left 
their families particularly vulnerable to Tatmadaw abuses. The following account is typical 
of the experience of villagers in northern Karen state: 
 
In 1997 we were living in Da Baw Kee village. My husband fled to the 
jungle when Burma Army Light Infantry Division No. 77 troops entered 
the village, because he did not want to be captured and taken as a porter. 
As I had malaria at the time, I did not flee with my husband, but stayed 
at home with my five-year-old daughter. The troops came into the house 
                                                   
67 Human Rights Watch interview with villager from Baw Lo village, Papun District, May 2003. 
68 Various interviews, May-July 2003. 
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where I was lying, and looted everything; they even stepped on my head! 
One of the soldiers pointed his gun at my daughter, and took the packet 
of chilies she was holding – our only food. Later, the soldiers returned, 
and interrogated me about the whereabouts of my husband. The Captain 
stole my bracelet (which my mother had given me) ‘to give to his wife in 
Mandalay.’ Although we were hungry, they wouldn’t let us cook, or even 
go to the toilet.69 
 
B.E., a thirty-three-year-old S’ghaw Karen, is now in the Mae La refugee camp in Tak 
Province in Thailand. The region he used to live in was classified as a “brown area,” 
meaning it was contested by the Tatmadaw and KNLA. His village was a cluster of 
houses. Most people were farmers, and there was a small school and a clinic. B.E. had 
lived in the area for most of his life as a farmer, teacher, and part-time medic. 
 
According to B.E., Burmese soldiers would use the villagers for forced labor routinely. 
He was forced ten times to “show the way” for Tatmadaw patrols. This could mean 
impressments for a day or several days. Often this would entail him guiding Tatmadaw 
patrols through landmine-infested jungle paths. The soldiers treated the people in his 
village very badly. B.E. said that two Karen women in his village were raped by Burmese 
army soldiers. He said he was once beaten by a Burmese soldier because he 
remonstrated with him for stealing a chicken. In late 1998 at a Karen festival, Tatmadaw 
soldiers came into the village. 
 
They didn’t say any words, they just started to beat us. They killed all the 
livestock, beat people, then left.70 
 
In mid-2003, fighting intensified in their area between the Tatmadaw, with their DKBA 
allies, and the KNLA. Forced labor increased to assist the Burmese soldiers to carry their 
supplies. The village held a meeting after a month of the fighting to decide what to do. 
Most of the villagers, but not all, decided they should move to the border away from the 
fighting. They sent one person to contact the KNLA to let them know they would be 
leaving, and asking instructions on where to go. “No one wanted to leave. But if I stayed 
in the village I would always be afraid.”  
 
The whole village––thirty families comprising 158 men, women and children––fled 
nearly a month later. The very morning they fled––September 7––the Burmese soldiers 
                                                   
69 Human Rights Watch interview with N.B. and S.M. at Hor Ker IDP settlement, Papun District, May 2003. 
70 Human Rights Watch interview with B.E. at La Refugee Camp, Tak Province, Thailand, January 7, 2005. 
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shelled the village with mortar fire, injuring two men and one woman. It took all day to 
walk through landmine-infested jungle to reach the Moei River that forms the border 
with Thailand. At the border, they were assisted by KNLA soldiers with small amounts 
of food, but it was still not safe so they were moved further along the border the next 
day. 
 
B.E.’s wife was heavily pregnant when they left, and he said she was very afraid of the 
landmines as they walked. All the people crossed over to the Thai side where they stayed 
in the jungle at Le Min Jaw, supported by international NGOs. “There was no work to 
do, we just stayed there.” Most of the people arrived in Mae La refugee camp on 
October 8, 2003, although two families returned to their village in Karen State because 
family members who were with the DKBA summoned them. 
 
B.E. is not happy to be in the camp, living in a small hut on the steep mountainside.  
 
I don’t want to be here but I can’t go back. There are so many 
landmines. How can I go back? Now the DKBA live in the village 
(area). We cannot go back. 
 
The KNLA also employs some of these tactics. Villagers taken as porters for the KNLA 
worked without payment, but sometimes received rice from other villagers. Villagers 
were usually required to work for a day or two. While some Karen justified such human 
rights violations in the name of solidarity with the struggle against the SPDC, saying they 
are the same ethnicity and the KNLA protects them,71 other Karen expressed anger at 
the KNLA’s forced conscription of porters and soldiers.72  
 
IV. Internal Displacement 
 
Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or 
obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a 
result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized 
violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have 
not crossed an internationally recognized State border.73 
                                                   
71 Human Rights Watch interviews, May-July 2003. 
72 Human Rights Watch interview with Karen NGO staff, Rangoon, October 9, 2004. 
73 The U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (U.N. Document E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2; November 11, 
1998). 
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The U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, from which the above definition 
of an IDP is taken, provide an authoritative restatement of existing international human 
rights, humanitarian and refugee law as it relates to the protection of internally displaced 
persons. The Guiding Principles address all phases of displacement: providing 
protection against arbitrary displacement; ensuring protection and assistance during 
displacement; and, establishing guarantees for safe return, resettlement, or reintegration. 
By drawing heavily on existing law and standards, the Guiding Principles are intended to 
provide practical guidance to governments, the U.N., and other intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations in their work with IDPs.  
 
Crucially, the Guiding Principles make no assumptions about whether return, staying 
put, or resettlement in a new home is the preferable solution for the person concerned. 
Rather, principles 28-30 emphasize that the authorities must provide IDPs with 
objective, accurate information and include them in the decision-making processes that 
lead to their voluntary return or resettlement, or to remaining in the place where they 
sought refuge. 
 
In practice there is often no clear line as to when a displaced person is no longer 
considered to be displaced.  
 
Why they are displaced 
Forced displacement is a military strategy that depopulates ethnic minority areas and 
denies insurgents a civilian support base. Forced displacement is prohibited by 
international humanitarian law: Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, reflective of 
customary law, provides that no displacement shall be ordered for reasons related to the 
conflict, unless civilians must move for their own security or a clear military imperative. 
Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures must be taken 
so that the civilian population obtains satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, 
medical, safety, and nutrition.74 
 
In Burma the most common causes of displacement include military operations and 
direct attacks, human rights abuses, land and crop confiscation––often in the context of 
state-sponsored development projects––and the placement of landmines in otherwise 
usable land. Traditionally, Burma’s ethnic nationality groups, most of which live in the 
hills, have responded to oppression by moving further up into the hills. But the strategy 
                                                   
74 Geneva Conventions, Protocol II, Article 17. 
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of organized flight became less viable as borders became more clearly demarcated and 
patrolled between the 1950s and 1980s. As insurgent groups lost territory to the 
Tatmadaw in the 1990s, displaced people could no longer move further into rebel-
controlled “liberated zones” behind the front lines of conflict.  
 
All Karen IDPs interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that there was often 
fighting in or near the villages they fled, mostly between the KNLA and Tatmadaw; 
sometimes between the KNLA and DKBA. Villagers fled when they heard that the 
Tatmadaw had arrived near their villages. Such evacuations were usually organized by 
KNLA troops. As most informants had good reason to fear the Tatmadaw, they 
considered this to be a protective service, allowing them to escape in advance of army 
patrols.  
 
Sometimes people fled due to forced labor and porterage, arbitrary taxation and looting, 
the destruction of crops and housing, and other human rights abuses experienced over 
an extended period of time. These cases of people fleeing when a situation became 
intolerable, due to a series of abuses, illustrate the impact of militarization, chronic 
insecurity, and counter-insurgency activity on local economies and livelihoods. 
 
Developmental displacement is also now alarmingly common. Forced relocation 
commonly makes way for––and is conducted to provide forced labor on––road building 
and other infrastructure projects.75 Roads bring a cash economy with them, and add 
value to land––thus sometimes motivating further expropriation.  
 
Communities have also been forcibly displaced without compensation for other kinds of 
development projects, including the construction of mines76, irrigation systems77, and 
natural gas and oil extraction facilities. In March 1997 the Tatmadaw and DKBA forced 
villagers to move to Mae Wei relocation site, in southwest Papun District, prior to 
intensive logging activities.78 The planned construction of a series of large hydroelectric 
dams is of similar concern in Karen State. In November 2004 Karen Rivers Watch 
                                                   
75 International Labor Organization, “Developments concerning the question of the observance by the 
Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labor Convention,” 1930 (March 2002). For information on extensive 
forced labor, in Karen State and elsewhere, since the government’s November 1st 2001 order banning the 
practice, see Karen Human Rights Group, “Forced Labor Orders Since the Ban: A Compendium of SPDC Order 
Documents Demanding Forced Labor Since November 2000,” February 8, 2002, KHRG #2002-01. 
76 In 1999 there were reportedly thirty-five major mines in Burma. Roger Moody/ Canada Pacific Asia Resources 
Network, Grave Diggers: A Report on Mining in Burma (1999), p. 20.  
77 Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), Internal Displacement and Vulnerability, p. 35. 
78 Earth Rights International (ERI) and Karen Environment and Social Action Network (KESAN), Capitalizing on 
Conflict, p. 34. 
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(KRW), a coalition of Karen NGOs, reported that three-quarters of the 85 villages in the 
vicinity of the planned dam sites had been forcibly relocated since 1995, displacing tens 
of thousands of civilians.79 Similar cases can be found across the country, in which 
ethnic nationality villages were forcibly relocated by the military prior to major 
infrastructure projects. As KRW noted, “the regime is using ‘development’ to justify its 
subjugation and militarization of the ethnic-controlled areas…and mask the root causes 
of civil war in Burma.”80  
 
In May 1989 the SLORC initiated a new Border Areas Development Program, 
ostensibly aimed at improving conditions in the ethnic minority borderlands.81 Despite 
SPDC claims to have spent U.S.$43 million since 199382 building 7,865 kilometers of 
roads, 763 bridges, 767 schools, fifty-four hospitals, thirty-two rural health care centers, 
and eighty-one dispensaries in border areas83, the program has done little to alleviate 
poverty84 and primarily served to consolidate military control over the rural population. 
The program has facilitated the militarization of border areas, bringing remote, 
previously semi-autonomous regions under centralized state control.  
 
In several cases, “development projects” have in fact induced displacement. In Kachin 
State, since the ceasefires the government has built roads and bridges on confiscated 
land, using forced labor. In December 2003 in Mon State, 1,400 houses in three wards of 
Moulmein were ordered to relocate so that a railway bridge could be built across the 
Salween River to Martaban (on completion, this will be the longest bridge in Burma). 
Householders were given one month’s notice to move. Some received nothing, while 
others received limited compensation (at 70 percent of the calculated value of their 
property), as well as plots of land at a new (relocation) site in Pat-kin Ward, east of the 
city. The authorities have forced other Moulmein residents to re-model their houses and 
streets, according to a standard model.85 
 
Forced displacement, termed as unlawful forced evictions, has been condemned under 
international law. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1993 concluded that 
                                                   
79 KRW (November 2004), p. 49 
80 Ibid. p. 3 
81 Ministry of Border Areas and National Races Development, Government of the Union of Myanmar, Measures 
Taken For Development of Border Areas and National Races (1989-1992) (Rangoon 1992). 
82 Ministry for Progress of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs, Information Pamphlet 
(Rangoon 2003). 
83 “Myanmar top leader stresses border areas development,” Xinhua News Agency, March 30, 2004. 
84 Karin Eberhardt, “Myanmar Country Review” (Paper for presentation at III MMSEA Conference, Centre for 
Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge, Lijiang, Yunnan: August 12-18, 2002), p. 9. 
85 The Mon Forum, December 2003. 
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“forced evictions are a gross violation of human rights.”86 The term “forced evictions” 
has been defined by the U.N. Committee on Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights “as 
the permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or 
communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, 
and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.”87  
 
Forced eviction, except where carried out in accordance with the law and in conformity 
with international due process standards, not only violates the right to adequate housing, 
but may also result in violations of other rights, such the rights to security of the person 
and to one’s home.88 International law does allow for government exercise of eminent 
domain under appropriate circumstances. The Economic and Social Rights Committee 
urged states to ensure that, prior to any evictions, particularly those involving large 
groups, all feasible alternatives are explored in consultation with affected persons, with a 
view to avoiding, or at least minimizing, the use of force. Those facing eviction orders 
must have legal remedies available. And states should see to it that those evicted have a 
right to adequate compensation for any property affected.89  
 
Increasingly restricted access to land causes repeated forced migration. In a few cases, 
Karen IDPs moved in order to find better land for swidden rice farming. Under normal 
circumstances, this form of cultivation is rotational within traditionally-recognized village 
farmlands; not shifting or pioneering cultivation into new territory at the expense of old-
growth forests. Although Karen villages do occasionally relocate to better land, this is 
traditionally done in a manner that many claim does not undermine environmental 
sustainability. However, armed conflict in these areas do undermine traditional and 
                                                   
86 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1993/77, para. 1, See also U.N. Sub-Commission on the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, Resolution 1998/9 on Forced Evictions, 
E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/1998/9, August 20, 1998. 
87 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR), General Comment 7, The 
right to adequate housing: forced evictions, Article 11(1) of the Covenant (New York: United Nations, 1997), 
E/C.12/1997/4. 
88 According to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in its examination of 
forced evictions in an international human rights framework: “While the right to adequate housing is perhaps the 
most obvious human right violated by forced evictions, a number of other rights are also affected. The rights to 
freedom of movement and to choose one's residence, recognized in many international laws and national 
constitutions, are infringed when forced evictions occur. The right to security of the person, also widely 
established, means little in practical terms when people are forcibly evicted with violence, bulldozers and 
intimidation. Direct governmental harassment, arrests or even killings of community leaders opposing forced 
evictions are common and violate the rights to life, to freedom of expression and to join organizations of one's 
choice. In the majority of eviction cases, crucial rights to information and popular participation are also denied.” 
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet no. 25, “Forced Evictions and Human Rights,” 1996 
(available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs25.htm). 
89 UNCESCR, General Comment 7, para. 14. 
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sustainable forms of agriculture, forcing IDPs to adopt more nomadic forms of 
subsistence. 
 
Moreover, CBOs working inside the country also report that Tatmadaw battalions 
encroach upon and confiscate land to construct garrisons and produce food crops for 
government troops. Communities may be relocated shortly before harvest time, 
following which soldiers seize their crops.90 Confiscated land is also sold or leased to 
private agri-companies.91 Regardless of the purpose, the confiscation clearly contributes 
to displacement. 
 
How displacement happens 
The relocation process usually begins with a Tatmadaw column issuing a relocation order. 
Previously, this was likely to have been a written document, constituting evidence of 
state-sanctioned abuse. However, relocation orders are more likely to be issued verbally, 
often at a meeting of village headmen. Villagers are usually given between zero-seven 
days warning to leave their homes. Sometimes they are told to move to a designated 
relocation site, but villagers are not told where to go, just to vacate their homes. As 
Cusano notes, often “people assume a subtly defiant wait-and-see attitude…[and] ignore 
the first notice.”92 When the soldiers return, they usually enforce their orders with vigor.  
 
Human Rights Watch has received a video, shot between February 11-14, 2004, in 
Nyaunglebin District that includes interviews with people in and from Neh Toh village, 
Nyaunglebin District (Mone Township), who were in the process of being relocated. 
When the video was made, some people had left Neh Toh already, while others are seen 
taking down parts of their houses and moving out––on foot, by bicycle and on bullock 
cart. Footage of the village––and its big church and good houses––is followed by 
testimony describing how, ten days earlier, villagers received an order from a Tatmadaw 
Light Infantry Battalion to move to a relocation site, three miles from the nearest 
Tatmadaw base. They were not told why they had to move.93  
 
The process began on October 1, 2003, when Tatmadaw Battalion 599, commanded by 
Major Win Tway, ordered the village to relocate to Ten Kwee, on the Kyauk Gyi-Mone 
                                                   
90 Human Rights Watch interview, May 19, 2005. 
91 Confidential documents on file at Human Rights Watch.  
92 Chris Cusano, “Burma: Displaced Karens: 'Like water on the Khu Leaf,'” in Mark Vincent and Brigitte 
Refslund Sorensen (eds), Caught Between Borders: Response Strategies of the Internally Displaced (Pluto 
Press, Norwegian Refugee Council, 2001), p. 149.  
93 This testimony has been independently confirmed by KHRG (September 6, 2004, KHRG #2004-U2). 
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road on fourteen acres of farmland confiscated from local villagers. The deadline for 
relocation was January 19, 2004, but no villagers moved. On February 2, 2004, the order 
was repeated and villagers were told to move within two days. Some people emptied 
their houses and rice barns and proceeded to the new site by bullock cart. The villagers 
had to build temporary bamboo and leaf lean-to shelters at Ten Kwee. They were not 
allowed to stay with relatives in nearby villages, nor allowed to forage locally for roofing 
or building materials.  
 
The new site is in the rice fields, with no shelter. People are beginning to build bamboo 
lean-tos. Informants describe conditions and restrictions at the relocation site and the 
forced labor and taxes demanded by the Tatmadaw. Those who have moved there now 
suffer various health problems because they lack food and clean water and must sleep on 
the ground. They have no access to schools.  
 
The Tatmadaw burned the empty houses at Neh Toh, leaving only the Baptist and 
Catholic churches standing. Adding insult to injury, the villagers also were later forced to 
“donate” 200,000 Kyat (over U.S.$200) to Battalion 599. 
 
Often, the relocation area is declared a free-fire zone. Houses, animals and crops are 
looted and destroyed, and people are raped or shot. Villagers in armed conflict zones are 
usually prepared to flee at short notice. Karen IDPs typically move as one or two 
families together; in other cases, whole villages move but split up to avoid Tatmadaw 
patrols. Most have bundles of possessions ready to move quickly, and have often 
prepared secret rice stores, hidden in the jungle, though the military often searches for 
and destroys these.  
 
Previous surveys have estimated that IDP households in hiding had to move three to 
four times per year, although the number of displacement incidents has declined 
significantly since the announcement in December 2003 of a ceasefire between the KNU 
and SPDC.94  
 
When fleeing, displaced Karens reported they could only move on foot. They hid in the 
jungle and walked only at night, even in the rain. They carried small pots, pans and rice 
to cook with on the way, and sometimes some clothes. Often they were afraid of lighting 
a fire, fearing it would attract Tatmadaw attention. As a Karen woman, interviewed in 
2003, said: 
                                                   
94 Chris Cusano, “Burma: Displaced Karens: 'Like water on the Khu Leaf,'” p. 4 & p. 44. 
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It was the rainy season, and we fled for hours to reach the hiding place 
in the jungle, because the SPDC and KNLA were fighting. When we got 
there we were so tired, but too scared to light the fire for cooking or to 
warm ourselves, so we went to sleep without food, under the trees. We 
didn’t care, and weren’t scared of leaches any more. If our baby cried, 
we put a piece of cloth in his mouth to stop him crying.95 
 
Some people hide in the forest for few days during the immediate displacement crisis, 
and then return to their village. Tatmadaw columns often return repeatedly to cleared 
areas, to ensure that they are not re-settled. In the event the military does not return, 
some villagers will return to re-build their burnt and looted homes and rice barns.  
 
While some IDPs migrate and resettle elsewhere––in temporary jungle settlements, in 
nearby towns or villages, or as refugees in Thailand––others attempt to hide in the jungle 
for up to several years. Displaced villagers in hiding are targeted and subjected to human 
rights abuses, including extra-judicial killing, on suspicion of being rebel supporters. 
Their temporary shelters, often little more than bamboo lean-tos, are scattered in remote 
locations, to avoid Tatmadaw patrols. They clear small areas of jungle to grow rice, 
tapioca, yams, and other vegetables, forage for supplementary food, and fish in the 
streams.96 When they run out of rice, they often resort to drinking the much less 
nutritious boiled rice soup,97 though the communities in hiding are known for sharing 
resources and especially food with each other.98 They are also at times able to 
communicate with family and friends in relocation sites and other government-
controlled areas, which sometimes allows them to gain access to food and other items. 
  
Patterns of forced relocation  
In mid-2004 the TBBC and partner groups detected “a significant decrease in the 
number of villages forcibly relocated since the mid-late 1990s … [due to the Tatmadaw’s] 
consolidating rather than expanding areas of control.”99 In reality, consolidating control 
means placing IDPs in Tatmadaw-run relocation sites. These are found across central and 
southern Shan State, in Karenni, Karen and Mon States and Tenasserim Division, as well 
                                                   
95 Human Rights Watch interview with Karen woman at Hor Ker IDP settlement, Papun District, May 2003. 
96 According to the CIDKP, “for a family of four to hide and survive in Tenasserim Division, they need to clear 
more than five acres of forest.” See “Reclaiming the Right to Rice,”  Burmese Border Consortium, October 2003, 
p. 14. 
97 Burma Ethnic Research Group (BERG), Forgotten Victims of a Hidden War, p. 38. 
98 In October 2004 the TBBC reported that 64 percent of IDPs surveyed had borrowed (rice or cash) over the 
previous year: Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), Internal Displacement and Vulnerability, p. 4.  
99 Ibid. p. 2. 
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as in parts of central Burma. The TBBC recorded one hundred government-controlled 
relocation sites in Karen areas, and the overall site population in those areas is probably 
in excess of 125,000 people. For the purpose of analysis, these sites may be divided into 
Relocation Centers and Relocation Villages, which vary with respect to the degree of 
Tatmadaw control. 
 
The distinction between different types of relocation sites and organic settlements in 
Burma is rather arbitrary, particularly in an historical context where some villages in the 
hills relocate periodically for socio-economic reasons, such as to gain access to new land. 
Furthermore, it is by no means clear when a relocated settlement stops being a 
relocation site. Most villages in eastern Burma have experienced displacement at some 
time over the fast half-century, in the context of a protracted civil war and wider state-
society conflict. In many cases, people have rebuilt their lives and integrated in new 
settlements.  
 
Nevertheless, classic style Relocation Centers and Relocation Villages still exist in many 
areas. The state or Tatmadaw sometimes provide a few weeks or few months supply of 
rice to new arrivals in Relocation Centers, although this has often been taken from other 
villagers’ granaries. In many cases, the government also provides limited education and 
health services, as it does in much of rural Burma. Access to schools and markets––and 
protection from further bouts of relocation afforded by residence in relocation sites––
explains the reluctance of some residents to leave, even when conditions allow.100 
 
Relocation Centers 
Relocation Centers are designated, constructed settlements rather than “natural” villages. 
Typically found in lowland areas near infrastructure projects and Tatmadaw bases,101 the 
residents of these centers usually come from a dozen or more outlying villages after they 
are forced to move by the Tatmadaw. 
 
Relocation is usually difficult because new arrivals have no money or possessions and 
cannot find regular paid work. In addition, many Relocation Centers require residents to 
hand over their remaining rice stocks to the local authorities, which then ration these 
back to villagers. Even in sites where residents retain control over their own food stocks, 
these are likely to be insufficient for subsistence, due to regular looting by the Tatmadaw, 
                                                   
100 In some cases, Karen and Karenni relocation site residents welcome the fact that they no longer have to pay 
taxes to, or be intimidated by, insurgent groups. 
101 In some cases, Tatmadaw bases are located in the relocation centers. 
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restricted access to agricultural land102, and poor soil quality. Unless the new arrivals 
have money or relatives in the area, they often cannot acquire any land at Relocation 
Centers. As a result, food is often quite expensive and there are appear to be high rates 
of chronic malnutrition in Relocation Centers. 
 
Access to water, clinics, medicines, and other social services remain minimal or non-
existent. IDPs––even though destitute––are likely to be charged for any medicines 
available. Large numbers of people are reported to have died of treatable illness, and 
suicides are apparently also common. While the Relocation Centers do afford some 
access to state-funded schools and buildings, teachers and books are often in short 
supply. In addition, school fees are typically charged, and, as is the case in the rest of 
government-controlled Burma, ethnic nationality children may not study their own 
languages in school. 
 
People living in Relocation Centers are liable to various––official and unofficial––taxes, 
and are also often subject to extensive bouts of forced labor on state-sponsored projects, 
such as roads. Such depredations leave families with little time and human resources to 
devote to their own survival. In some cases, the amount of labor demanded is so great as 
to occupy entire families full-time. The only alternative is to pay others to go on their 
behalf, which most cannot afford. 
 
Relocation Center residents would obviously rather not be displaced again, and therefore 
many opt to stay in the centers, even after departure becomes an option. Some stay 
because there are greater market and work opportunities than in their original isolated 
villages.103 Conditions at some sites––typically those that have been established for 
longer periods of time––are better than others. In some cases, there are schools, some 
paid work, and communities are able to reestablish their lives. In such cases, residence is 
often no longer, or not entirely, a product of coercion, and it is debatable whether such 
new villages should still be considered relocation sites. 
 
However, the lack of food and extremely difficult conditions eventually drive large 
numbers of residents to flee. In many cases, as in Karenni State in 1999-2002, authorities 
turn a blind eye to these departures and IDPs are able to return to––and attempt to 
                                                   
102 Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), Internal Displacement and Vulnerability, p. 46. 
103 Until late 2003 – when a new round of forced relocation began in the Mawchi area of southern Karenni State 
– many of those remaining in the half-dozen relocation sites in Karenni State did so because health and 
education services, markets and jobs were more readily available than in the chronically under-developed and 
war-torn hills. In contrast however, large numbers of Karen and other villagers continue to reside in relocation 
sites against their will, in Tenasserim Division and elsewhere. 
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rebuild––their old villages. In others, such as Tenasserim Division in the same period, 
departing Relocation Center residents cannot go back to their villages and they join the 
IDP population hiding in the jungle, among whom are likely to be fellow-villagers who 
fled following the original relocation orders and chose to take their chances in the hills. 
Many of these people are subject to further rounds of forcible relocation. A few make it 
to the uncertain refuge of neighboring Thailand.  
 
Relocation Villages 
In addition to Relocation Centers, the SPDC has also used pre-existing settlements as 
“Relocation Villages.” These are found across large swaths of rural Burma, and in some 
areas, such as the Tenasserim Division, they are the only villages remaining. The 
occupants of these villages usually include people who have not been displaced from the 
area, people moved from nearby hamlets, and IDPs from other previously relocated 
villages. 
 
Relocation Villages are smaller than Relocation Centers, and more difficult to document 
and map. They may be situated in areas firmly controlled by government forces, with 
Tatmadaw bases nearby, but are sometimes also found in brown areas, where insurgent 
forces have some operational capacity. Residents are in general subject to less strict 
control than those of the big Relocation Centers. While the Tatmadaw controls entry and 
exit, and residents are often forced into labor, they do usually have some opportunity to 
tend their farms due to greater geographical proximity to their former homes. Some 
Relocation Villages have schools, though most do not. In some areas, Relocation 
Villages are allowed to remain in situ––households are moved from the periphery to the 
centre of the relocation village–if they pledge not to have contact with insurgent forces. 
The Tatmadaw frequently warns such villages that, if any fighting should occur in the 
area, they will be forced to move. 
  
However, Relocation Village inhabitants suffer the same problems with respect to land 
confiscation, overcrowding, and disease. A forty-seven-year-old farmer described 
conditions at one such site:  
 
We had a bamboo house at Plaw Lah Hay Relocation Site, but it was 
difficult to get enough good bamboo, because we were not allowed out 
of the Relocation Site. The Burma Army soldiers gave us two pots for 
cooking, but the rest of our household goods we had to find for 
ourselves. We had to sell our rice and betel nut crops, which was very 
difficult. Our family struggled to support ourselves. All the time, the 
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Burma Army took porters and watchmen, and stole our few 
possessions.104 
 
Consequences of displacement 
The forty-six Karen interviewed by Human Rights Watch had experienced an average of 
approximately thirty displacement episodes per person. Following recent major 
displacement crises in northern Karen State––in 1995, 1997 and 2000––they had moved 
on average over three times a year.105 
 
The consequences of repeated displacement are grim and will not be easily remedied in 
the short term. According to the TBBC, “1 percent of the internally displaced 
population had been killed or wounded by military assault during the past two years 
alone.”106 And not only does displacement––even into Relocation Centers or Villages––
often fail to mean an end to human rights violations for IDPs, but it is also extremely 
difficult for them to achieve security with respect to food, land, and livelihood. The 
displacement also leaves large tracts of the countryside unable to resist predatory 
development projects and greater state control.  
 
Displaced parents often leave their children in the care of churches or monasteries in 
larger villages or towns. Although such circumstances allow for education and greater 
security, it also leads to family break-ups. The practice is generally discouraged by 
development agencies’ best practice guidelines unless the families can remain in contact. 
However, in the context of protracted armed conflict and repeated displacement in 
                                                   
104 Human Rights Watch interview with displaced Karen farmer, Papun District, June 2003. 
105 Informants from Nyaunglebin District (90 percent) were more likely to have fled direct fighting than those 
from Papun (76 percent). Papun District IDPs were more likely to have fled due to generalized human rights 
abuses (8 percent – against 3 percent) or to get better land (13 percent). These results are to be expected, as 
the Nyaunglebin District informants had fled the boundaries of their home district, and were therefore more 
likely to be selected for interview as obvious IDPs. The fact that interviews were conducted in Papun District 
means that a greater range of causes were likely to be mentioned by people from this area, nearly 10 percent of 
whose displacement episodes were related to traditional agricultural practices. These observations indicate 
limitations in the project methodology: the data cannot be extrapolated to cover the entire population, even of 
the displaced population, of northern Karen State. It does seem probable, however, that the results for Papun 
District more accurately reflect general migration and displacement trends in this area (88 percent of 
displacement episodes related to armed conflict). Incidents in Nyanglebin District include the March 3, 2004 
meeting between Tatmadaw commanders and village headmen from Kyauk Gyi (Ler Doh) Township. The 
following villages were ordered to relocate, by July 3, 2004: Pay Tu and Sa Leh villages to the Kyauk Gyi-Shwe 
Kyin motor road; Pa T’la Village Tract to Ain Kyin Kun Relocation Site; Weh La Htaw village to Ain Kyin Kun and 
Ya Myo Aung Relocation Sites; No Graw, Peh Thraw and Shwe Thaw villages to Htee Hta Relocation Site; 
Thoo K’bee and Nyaw Hta villages to Ain Kyin Kun and Ya Myo Aung Relocation Sites; Way Daw Ko village to 
Kyaw S’yit Relocation Site; and K’moh Eh and Wei Byin villages to Ain Neh Relocation Site. 
106 Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), Internal Displacement and Vulnerability, p. 45. 
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Karen State, such responses may be the only way of providing children with some 
security, and minimal access to education.  
 
Areas to which IDPs flee are not necessarily safer. KST is a fifty-three-year-old Pwo 
Karen woman from Ka Law Gaw Village, Dooplaya District, near the Thai-Burma 
border (Tak Province). KST told Human Rights Watch she “cannot remember” exactly 
how many times she has been either forcibly relocated, chose to flee the fighting, or 
moved because of forced labor duties, but said she has been displaced “over one 
hundred times” in her life. Human Rights Watch interviewed her days after she fled 
SPDC attacks on her village with her husband and two young children she cares for. She 
stayed along the border for two nights, sleeping in the open, before coming into 
Thailand the following day. The interview was cut short due to a loud explosion nearby, 
which Karen authorities said was SPDC artillery in the vicinity of Ka Law Gaw village.  
 
Tatmadaw restrictions on movement, ranging from denial of access to farms to mining of 
farmland107, undermine food security. Swidden farmers return to their former fallow 
fields too soon, before the soil has regained its fertility, or have no choice but to clear 
entirely near swaths of forest. Villagers are essentially forced into harvesting forest 
products “at unsustainable rates in order to earn enough money to purchase food and 
other necessities. These factors have contributed to large scale clear-cutting in many 
areas and a range of environmental problems.”108 
 
Sustainable livelihoods in these areas are particularly vulnerable to conflict, militarization, 
and displacement. Among other problems, these factors make it difficult for villagers to 
tend their fields, and guard against pests such as rats and wild pigs––all factors that 
further undermine food security. According to the CIDKP, upland farmers in hiding are 
generally able to harvest only 40 to 50 percent of their crop for the year.109  
 
In addition, the conflict cuts the long-established links between lowland traders, and 
Karen and other hill peoples, denying both communities markets for their respective 
goods. Tatmadaw and DKBA blockades in these areas also cause prices for rice and other 
goods to sharply rise as market access is curtailed. Rice prices in Nyaunglebin District 
reportedly rose by 25 percent in 2003, to 5,000 Kyat per tine (U.S.$5 per kg.).110 In many 
                                                   
107 See Landmine Monitor (September 2003).  
108 Earth Rights International (ERI) and Karen Environment and Social Action Network (KESAN), Capitalizing on 
Conflict, p. 61. 
109[ Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), Internal Displacement and Vulnerability, p. 30. 
110 Ibid. p. 21.  
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conflict-affected areas “it is only possible for villagers in hiding to access traders if they 
can send a message to the towns and KNU can arrange a temporary and unofficial 
‘jungle market.’”111 As a result, three-quarters of IDPs surveyed by TBBC and partner 
groups in 2004 had suffered food shortages for at least one month in the previous year, 
while 20 percent had access to sufficient food for less than three months.112  
 
IDPs also have virtually no access to health care. The IDP population tends to be 
disproportionately made up of children, elderly people, widows, orphans, and the 
disabled113––in other words, particularly vulnerable groups with already-low life 
expectancies.114 Child mortality and malnutrition rates among IDPs are “double Burma’s 
national baseline data and comparable to those recorded amongst internally displaced 
populations in the Horn of Africa.”115 IDPs interviewed by Human Rights Watch 
reported their most common ailments as malaria and fever, chicken pox, and serious 
gastrointestinal problems like diarrhea and dysentery. None of the interviewees had 
heard of HIV/AIDS. 
 
Access to education is limited for IDPs, particularly beyond the primary level.116 The 
SPDC claims a national literacy rate of 90 percent, but researchers in Karen State 
estimated the rate at about 72 percent.117 In most villages where Human Rights Watch 
interviewees had lived – whether temporary or established settlements – there were no 
schools. However, many informants reported sending their children to schools in nearby 
towns and villages, and sometimes to the refugee camps in Thailand, where there are 
fifty-seven schools for about thirty-six thousand students. A network of some 720 
community schools exists across Karen areas of Burma, including six high schools in 
KNU liberated zones.118 But many of these schools consist of little more than a few 
bamboo benches under the trees, lack books, pencils, and paper, and are frequently 
displaced or destroyed. In partnership with local teachers and self-help organizations, the 
KNU Education Department (KED) attempts to standardize the curriculum and 
                                                   
111 Ibid.  
112 Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), Internal Displacement and Vulnerability, p. 50. 
113 Ibid. p. 75. 
114 Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), Internal Displacement and Vulnerability, p. 40. 
115 Ibid. pp. 3-5. The actual reported child mortality rate is 2.4 deaths per 10,000 children under five per day, 
and 16 percent of all children are malnourished, a figure typically considered “acute.” 
116 Confidential documents in possession of Human Rights Watch. 
117 Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), Internal Displacement and Vulnerability, p. 79. 
118 Karen Education Department, School Statistics for Academic Year 2004-05; Human Rights Watch interviews 
with Karen educators, Thailand border, October 13-18, 2004. 
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examinations within this massively under-funded system, which still enjoys close links 
with schools in the refugee camps.119 
 
When these circumstances threaten IDPs’ ability to survive, many attempt to flee to 
neighboring countries. Most Karen refugees (and many of the more than one million 
Burmese migrant workers) in Thailand have previously spent several months or years as 
IDPs in Burma. Since the mid-late 1990s, the journey to Thailand has become 
increasingly difficult and dangerous, due to the prevalence of landmines, and because the 
Tatmadaw (and Thai military) has sealed the border. 
 
V. Lessons from Ceasefires in Kachin and Mon States 
 
In 1994 and 1995 Kachin and Mon armed groups signed ceasefires with the government. 
Research conducted by the TBBC in eastern Burma in 2004 and field work conducted 
by Human Rights Watch in eastern and northern Burma between 2002-2005 
demonstrates that living conditions for IDPs in these ceasefire and adjacent 
government-controlled areas are generally better than in conflict zones or relocation 
sites. There are, however, ongoing problems with displacement and human rights 
violations. An analysis of how residents of the affected areas have fared offers an idea of 
the kinds of issues that need to be addressed so that IDPs benefit as much as possible 
from any ceasefire that may take place between the KNU and SPDC. Examining the 
consequences of the 1994 Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and 1995 New 
Mon State Party (NMSP) ceasefire agreements may also inform potential domestic and 
international assistance programs. 
 
Kachin state 
Following a ceasefire agreed with the government in 1994, the KIO organized the return 
of ten thousand refugees from China and helped to resettle about sixty thousand IDPs 
within Kachin State. Although the KIO and local Kachin NGO resettlement and 
reconstruction activities generally exhibited poor strategic and site planning due to 
limited human and financial resources, an impressive range of infrastructure and 
community development projects was nevertheless implemented.  
                                                   
119 The KED runs one middle school and one high school in Papun District. All other schools in the district are 
primary level (kindergarten and first standard, sometimes through to fourth standard). The KNLA also runs a 
few schools in Papun District, and there are also some slightly better equipped mission schools (SDA and 
Baptist), with links to the churches inside Burma and on the border. A few monasteries also run school classes. 
Several schools are linked to the state system – and may sometimes be classified as both KNU and SPDC 
schools. 
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There has been a limited peace dividend in Kachin State. Most encouraging is the post-
ceasefire re-emergence of civil-society networks, although the KIO remains ambivalent 
regarding the role of civil society groups. Today in Kachin areas there are many more 
CBOs and local NGOs than before the ceasefire. Such local associations grew out of a 
war-ravaged population and have provided services to resettled IDPs and others, while 
slowly building local capacity.  
 
However, the post-ceasefire situation in Kachin State presents a mixed picture. The 
government’s attitude towards the Kachin and other ceasefire areas has been one of 
neglect––or active obstruction. Kachin leaders claim that the SPDC wants to keep their 
area underdeveloped and attempts to undermine the KIO’s standing within Kachin 
communities. International donors could have done more to directly support the local 
population following the ceasefire.  
 
Several other negative developments present worrying precedents. The main cause of 
post-ceasefire displacement in Kachin State is land rights. Although counter-insurgency 
motivated forced relocations have stopped, communities continue to still lose their land, 
due to: 
• Post-ceasefire militarization, and farmland confiscated by the Tatmadaw. Before 
the ceasefire, there were four battalions in Bhamo District, southern Kachin 
State; by 2004, there were eleven, each of which had reportedly confiscated three 
hundred-four hundred acres of land. 
• Up to four thousand people have been displaced by large-scale jade mining 
around Hpakhant in western Kachin State. Increased post-ceasefire logging and 
gold mining activities have also brought environmental damage to several areas, 
as well as charges of corruption against officials of different ceasefire groups.  
• Large-scale agriculture projects have also often involved unlawful land 
confiscation, as has development-induced displacement, such as road, bridge, 
and airport construction in the state capital of Myitkyina, all of which have been 
carried out without regard for international standards on forced eviction. 
 
All of these factors have been causes of continued forced displacement since the 
ceasefire––people are still being displaced, although the reasons have changed. In many 
cases, the abuses outlined above––particularly land loss, plus the prevalence of forced 
labor––have undermined villagers’ livelihoods so severely that they have had little choice 
but to migrate either within Burma, or to a neighboring country. Indeed, food insecurity, 
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loss of livelihood, and lack of access to basic services (such as education and health) are 
probably the most widespread and chronic causes of forced displacement in Burma.  
 
Mon state 
The Mon situation illustrates similar themes. Between 1993-96––and especially after the 
1995 New Mon State Party (NMSP) ceasefire––about ten thousand Mon refugees were 
forced up to and across the border by the Thai authorities. The Mon refugees were 
repatriated to NMSP-controlled ceasefire zones, with help from international NGOs.  
 
Some refugees returned home, but most remained in limbo, in camp-like conditions just 
over the border, with only limited access to agricultural land. Although now largely 
invisible to Thailand and the international community, most of the Mon returnees have 
still not returned home and continue to face chronic livelihood and food security 
problems. Most remain partially dependant on decreasing amounts of humanitarian aid. 
Meanwhile, as a consequence of ongoing human rights abuses and renewed outbreaks of 
insurgency in Mon State, newly displaced villagers continue to seek refuge in the Mon 
ceasefire zones.  
 
As in Kachin State, the most serious post-ceasefire problems in Mon State relate to land 
rights. Since 1998, more than eleven thousand acres of farmland have been confiscated 
without compensation by the Tatmadaw, mostly in order to build new garrisons. Adding 
insult to injury, farmers have sometimes been forced to work on the confiscated land, 
building barracks and farming on behalf of the army. Examples of development-induced 
displacement include the government’s practice of building roads and bridges on 
confiscated land, using forced labor.  
 
Nevertheless, there have also been some positive developments in Mon State over the 
past decade. An end to the armed conflict has generally improved basic protection of the 
civilian population, at least in the ceasefire zones.120 As in Kachin State, the ceasefires 
have brought new opportunities to develop agriculture and opportunities for travel and 
local trade, which is particularly important to villagers. In many villages, livelihoods have 
improved considerably over the past decade. 
 
Since the ceasefire, the Mon Women’s Organization (MWO) has extended its 
community development and adult literacy activities beyond the NMSP-controlled zones 
to Mon communities across lower Burma. Also, despite some serious setbacks, in 2004-
                                                   
120 Human Rights Watch interview with ex-KNU ceasefire group officer, May 6, 2005. 
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05 the NMSP Education Department and Mon CBOs provided Mon language teaching 
to over one hundred thousand students, approximately 70 percent of whom live in 
government-controlled areas, an achievement which would have been impossible before 
the ceasefire.  
 
Lessons learned 
There is a lack of impartial, comparative accounts of post-ceasefire developments in 
Burma. Given the possibility of a KNU-SPDC ceasefire, it is important that all 
interested parties—the SPDC, ethnic nationality groups, affected populations, CBOs, 
and international aid and lobbying organizations—have access to accurate information 
about such relevant past experience. This can help pave the way for sound judgments 
regarding possible solutions to problems in Karen (and Karreni and Shan) areas, 
particularly for IDPs.  
 
Recent research conducted in eastern Burma by the TBBC and its local partner groups is 
encouraging, as indicators show that conditions for IDPs and presumably others are 
significantly better in ceasefire areas than in government-controlled or war zones.121 
Civilians in ceasefire zones also have better access to education services.122 Educational 
opportunities should continue to be expanded. The involvement of CBOs has been a 
positive step.  
 
Maintaining the peace while creating sustainable livelihood opportunities will go a long 
way towards improving the situation of residents. Greater attention should be paid to 
the limited peace dividends in Kachin and Mon ceasefire areas and the often important 
role of local groups in successful resettlement and reconstruction. Today in Kachin 
State, and even more so in Mon State, there are many more CBOs and local NGOs than 
before the ceasefires. As noted above, such local associations have been able to provide 
services and capacity-building assistance to many resettled IDPs and other residents. 
 
However, there have also been significant post-ceasefire disappointments which must be 
avoided or ameliorated considerably, if any of the limited gains are to be consolidated. 
These include limited assistance to IDPs, ongoing fighting and post-ceasefire 
militarization, environmentally damaging natural resource extraction and development 
projects, forced labor, and land confiscation.  
 
                                                   
121 Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), Internal Displacement and Vulnerability, p. 76. 
122 Ibid. p. 80. 
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Human rights abuses, including land confiscation, must stop and be appropriately 
prosecuted. All parties to ceasefires need to commit to ensuring that the fundamental 
rights of the population are respected, including the right of access to humanitarian 
assistance. The Burmese government needs to address the abuses inevitably associated 
with the Tatmadaw’s self-support policy. Those affected by the confiscation of land and 
other property have a right to a remedy, and should be offered restitution, and/or other 
forms of compensation. Finally, given the long-term nature of this conflict and the 
legitimacy conferred on ethnic nationality groups by their people, international 
organizations should reconsider providing aid only to “state actors.”  
 
The past decade has been one of mostly missed opportunities to move from an 
environment of “peace making” to “peace building” in ceasefire areas. If these mistakes 
can be avoided, if Karen (and Karenni and Shan) and SPDC representatives can agree 
on mechanisms to address ceasefire violations, and if donors can be persuaded to 
support rehabilitation efforts in partnership with appropriate local civil society groups, 
then the rights and well-being of affected individuals will be better protected.  
 
VI. Humanitarian Responses 
 
Humanitarian agencies in Burma 
In June 2001 the heads of mission of eight U.N. agencies in Rangoon publicly expressed 
their support for “strengthening human capital, developing leadership capacity, and 
encouraging a more dynamic civil society will contribute to laying the foundations for 
democratic processes.”123  
 
However, the topic of external assistance to IDPs, whether in relocation sites, ceasefire 
areas or in hiding, is very sensitive. Although the role of foreign aid is limited, it can 
contribute towards the creation of an enabling environment, strengthening local efforts 
to achieve peace and development. It is vital that donors and international agencies 
entering Burma, via refugee communities, across the border, or through Rangoon, 
realize that they are not operating in a void. Impressive local initiatives exist, and are 
worthy of support. The challenge is how to foster the growth of civil society, without 
overwhelming its limited absorption capacities. Donors should not just concentrate on a 
narrow set of professional, western-style NGOs. In fostering the development of local 
NGOs, a nexus between development and democracy may gradually emerge. 
 
                                                   
123 U.N. Office of the Resident Coordinator (May 30, 2001). 
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Effective humanitarian assistance is often a function of access to affected communities, 
awareness of the particular issues at stake––including protection needs––and the 
magnitude of assistance offered. In this case, one of the key issues will be whether 
international or local agencies take the lead in assisting IDPs, and how they will provide 
that assistance. The SPDC has asked UNHCR to assist IDPs in areas of refugee return, 
while the KNU Foreign Affairs spokesman, David Taw, has indicated a preference for 
partnerships with local NGOs and CBOs.124 These developments may open the 
possibility of increased humanitarian and development assistance to Karen (and 
potentially other) IDPs. One of the key issues will be which organizations gain access to 
IDP communities, and how.  
 
Although many services to IDPs can and should be delivered by CBOs and local NGOs, 
they still need the political and technical support of international agencies. Only 
international agencies are able to offer the monitoring and protection that the long-
suffering civilian population urgently requires. Collaboration with appropriate partners is 
critical. 
 
Aid from inside Burma 
Although some Rangoon-based international agencies such as the ICRC and UNICEF 
are able to assist displaced people in Burma, they do not target IDPs as such. In cases 
where international agencies do provide assistance to displaced populations, this is 
usually done inadvertently, as often the agency concerned is not aware that its clients or 
beneficiaries have at some time in the past been displaced. It is therefore important for 
aid agencies to be aware that relocated communities should not necessarily be targeted 
separately from other vulnerable populations. 
 
The Burmese government does not permit international agencies access to the more 
tightly controlled Relocation Centers. Most humanitarian and other assistance reaching 
relocation sites comes from the affected communities themselves. This may take the 
form of self-help initiatives undertaken by extended family and ethnic nationality 
networks, often organized and mediated by local religious leaders. A more systematic 
approach has been adopted by some CBOs and local NGOs, which have established 
low-profile aid programs in a number of relocation sites in eastern Burma.  
 
In such cases, access to displaced populations must be negotiated with local Tatmadaw 
commanders and state officials, usually by local or national religious leaders. Groups 
                                                   
124 The Irrawaddy, February 18, 2004.  
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involved in such activities may be accused of abetting the state’s draconian forced 
relocation program. However, in providing relief in partnership with relocated 
populations, local NGOs help to build community networks and develop capacities. 
Such humanitarian efforts strengthen local civil society and human capital, in ways which 
contribute towards peace-making and conflict-transformation capacities, and indirectly 
support processes of political transition. Over the past two years in particular, local 
networks inside Burma have enhanced their capacities for assessing needs, and delivering 
assistance to IDPs in government-controlled areas. 
 
Cross-border assistance 
International agencies working inside the country do not have access to the zones of 
ongoing armed conflict in eastern Burma where protection and other humanitarian 
vulnerabilities are particularly acute. While some local NGOs and CBOs, especially 
church and Buddhist networks, do have some access to these areas, coverage is quite 
limited, and will remain so, until such time as ceasefires in these areas are consolidated. 
 
Some aid does reach IDPs in hiding from across the Thailand border. As noted by 
BERG, “the Thai authorities do not allow any registered NGOs … officially to develop 
programs of assistance across the border, although there is endorsement of temporary 
cross-border assistance in certain instances.”125  
 
Since the early 1990s, Karen––and later Chin, Shan, Karenni and Mon––teams have 
provided humanitarian relief and undertaken some community development and 
educational work among displaced communities in zones of ongoing armed conflict in 
eastern Burma. In October 2004 the TBBC reported that 30 percent of IDP households 
surveyed had accessed aid over the past year (17 percent in relocation sites, 35 percent in 
hiding sites, and 49 percent in ceasefire areas).126 
 
Thailand border-based groups’ strategic planning and research capacities are generally 
more developed than those working on displacement issues from inside Burma. In 
recent years, local and international agencies providing cross-border assistance to IDPs 
in eastern Burma have begun to develop sophisticated data collection and analysis tools.  
 
                                                   
125 Burma Ethnic Research Group (BERG), Forgotten Victims of a Hidden War, p. 5. 
126 Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), Internal Displacement and Vulnerability, p. 4 & p. 77. Of course, 
the respondents to this survey were a self-selecting sample.  
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Beneficiaries of cross-border aid are usually a self-selecting sub-group of IDPs in hiding, 
having put their trust in the KNU, KNPP, and the NMSP. The main cross-border 
assistance groups strive for impartiality by providing assistance to all in need.127 
However, they are not impartial, as they act in solidarity with armed opposition groups. 
For these reasons, donors have insisted that their programs be carefully monitored. 
 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
Since February 2004, UNHCR has conducted several assessment missions to Karen 
State and Tenasserim Division. In March 2004 the agency announced that it had 
negotiated access to refugee return areas in eastern Burma.128 With funding of about 
U.S.$800,000-1 million for the year 2004, it will support projects in community health 
education and de-mining. Under its arrangement with the government, UNHCR has 
gained access to most of the eleven townships in Burma (Tenasserim Division, Mon 
State and Karen State) from which the majority of refugees in Thailand have fled. For 
the first time it has gained access to Thai border areas from inside Burma via Rangoon. 
The agency has also been requested by the government to assist with IDP reintegration 
in areas of refugee return, though not elsewhere.129 
 
In mid-late 2004, UNHCR began to implement micro-projects in these townships, 
upgrading local infrastructure in areas of possible refugee return or in places where 
displaced persons may want to go. Despite some optimism within UNHCR about these 
developments, grave concerns remain over the extent of U.N. access in these border 
areas. As of October 2004, international staff had only been allowed to visit areas under 
government control. The Burmese authorities are likely to try to convince U.N. staff 
with modest knowledge of Burma that conditions in a few model villages are 
representative of the situation in more remote areas.130 However, UNHCR has made 
efforts to make it clear to the SPDC that it does not consider current conditions as being 
conducive to the return of refugees and that a settlement between the government and 
insurgent groups is an essential prerequisite for refugee return. UNHCR’s regular 
monitoring trips to parts of eastern Burma must be seen as only the first stage in 
establishing a genuinely protective field presence, in which it is able to advocate and 
intervene with the authorities on behalf of vulnerable populations in border areas.  
 
                                                   
127 Principles of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster 
Response Programmes (1994). 
128 “UNHCR gets permission to visit eastern Myanmar,” Associated Press, March 11, 2004. 
129 Human Rights Watch interview with UNHCR Myanmar staff, September 6, 2004.  
130 Analysis based on confidential U.N. documents, made available to Human Rights Watch, and Human Rights 
Watch interviews with local community leaders, May 17, 2005.  
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In a worrying development, UNHCR reportedly plans to implement health and 
education programs in areas of refugee return through the Myanmar Red Cross (MRC), 
though it has dropped plans to work with the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare 
Association (MMCWA). The MMCWA was formerly led by General Khin Nyunt’s wife. 
Both groups are widely considered to be fronts for the Burmese military. The agency 
already works with these organizations in its programs with repatriated Rohingya 
refugees in Arakan (Rakhine) State, where the U.N. has struggled to protect returned 
refugees from further rounds of abuse.131  
 
A better alternative would be for international agencies to form partnerships with local 
civil society groups, which are already working on the ground in many areas. These 
include CBOs active in government-controlled areas, including some relocations sites, 
and those working cross-border from Thailand, with IDPs in hiding, and in some 
ceasefire zones. Aid agencies must not be prevented by the government or ethnic armed 
groups from independently providing assistance to populations at risk; they should resist 
efforts by authorities to interfere with the impartial delivery of assistance or manipulate 
it for other purposes, such as to extend military control. Wherever possible, external 
support should empower local communities and civil society groups, many of which are 
operational in areas inaccessible to international agencies. It would undermine assistance 
efforts, for example, if U.N. agencies could only gain access to armed conflict-affected 
areas, including ceasefire zones, in the company of the Tatmadaw, or state-penetrated 
NGOs.  
 
Other U.N. agencies 
Since 1993, UNDP activities in Burma have been restricted to “programmes having 
grass-roots-level impact in a sustainable manner.” This mandate, which is highly unusual 
for the U.N., is designed to limit the agency’s engagement with the government. The 
UNDP Human Development Initiative works “particularly in the areas of primary health 
care, the environment, HIV/AIDS, training and education, and food security.”132  
 
Unlike most U.N. agencies, the U.N. Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) engages 
directly with ceasefire groups. In partnership with the government and the (ex-CPB) 
United Wa State Army (UWSA) ceasefire group, the UNODC and its international 
NGO implementing partners have built schools, dams and other facilities in the Wa sub-
state (northern Shan State). They reportedly have also had some success in reducing 
                                                   
131 Human Rights Watch interview with UNHCR Myanmar staff, September 6, 2004.  
132 UNDP Governing Council decision no. 92/21 (June 1993). 
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opium cultivation in Kokang and UWSA-controlled areas.133 However, according to one 
assessment, proposed “community development concepts … sometimes conflicted with 
the top-down (Wa) Authority approach. When efforts were made to involve the villagers 
… the Authority felt threatened.”134  
 
Although the UNODC has responded to UWSA calls for more infrastructure and 
agricultural assistance, efforts to promote community development and the emergence 
of CBOs have been largely unsuccessful. The U.N. has recently negotiated an agreement 
with the UWSA, under which community-based development methods will be allowed 
by the Wa authorities.135 However, members of the leadership of the UWSA were 
indicted on drug charges in a U.S. court in January 2005 and one faction of the UWSA 
(UWSA 171 Division) has in 2005 attacked the outskirts of the SSA base of Loi Taileng, 
which protects a few thousand IDPs, calling into question the good faith of the UWSA 
in these efforts.136 
 
A further important consideration is the UWSA’s forced relocation since 1999 of up to 
125,000 villagers from northern Shan State as part of its effort to eradicate opium 
production in the Wa hills and extend the boundaries of Wa State. These IDPs were 
moved to non-state controlled relocation sites in the southern part of the main UWSA 
ceasefire zone and to the UWSA’s Southern Command area on the Thailand border, 
where several thousand Shan and other local inhabitants have been displaced to make 
way for the newcomers.  
 
Another area where the U.N. may address humanitarian needs, while developing the 
roles and capacities of local civil society, is with HIV/AIDS programming. International 
agencies in Burma have access to a U.S.$35 million fund, as part of a coordinated 
                                                   
133 It should be noted that members of the leadership of the UWSA were indicted on drug charges in a U.S. 
court in January 2005 and that one faction (UWSA 171 Division) is currently attacking the outskirts of the SSA 
base of Loi Taileng which protects a few thousand IDPs. 
134 Joint Kokang-Wa Humanitarian Needs Assessment Team (mss 2003). 
135 A conference on Drugs and Conflict in Burma, held in Amsterdam in December 2003, called for the 
“simultaneous easing of drug control deadline pressures (to avoid the starvation of opium-producing farmers) 
and increased international humanitarian aid efforts. … [Strategic planning should] include the voices of the 
opium farmers themselves…. Local communities in drug growing areas, or their representatives, have not been 
able to participate in any of the decision-making processes of anti-drugs strategies that have such a 
tremendous impact on their livelihoods“: Drugs and Conflict in Burma (TNI & BCN 14/15-12-2003). Since March 
2004, the U.N. World Food Program has been providing rice to 180,000 ex-poppy farmers and their families in 
Kokang, Wa and neighboring areas, for a period of one year (at a cost of U.S.$3.7 million). 
136 See “Justice Department Charges Eight in Burma with Drug Trafficking,” United States Justice Department, 
January 8, 2005 [online], http://www.usconsulate.org.hk/ushk/others/2005/012401.htm (retrieved May 21, 
2005); Nandar Chann, UWSA Claims Wanted Drugs Suspects are Innocent,” The Irrawaddy, January 28, 2005 
[online], http://www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a=4340&z=153 (retrieved May 21, 2005). 
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HIV/AIDS campaign. Donors view this initiative as a test case for whether the U.N. 
system in Burma can carve out a sphere of greater independence, and exert a greater 
influence over government policy. Another key issue is whether the U.N. and 
international NGOs can establish mechanisms for building local NGO aid absorption 
capacity in this sector. 
 
The need for more and better data 
Until fairly recently, little attention was paid to the situation of IDPs in Burma. The 
increased concern with internal displacement in the east of the country since the late-
1990s reflects a growing awareness of the plight of IDPs world-wide, and a realization 
that most refugees in Thailand had previously spent extensive periods as IDPs before 
crossing the border.  
 
As a series of insurgent strongholds fell to the Tatmadaw during the 1990s, there was no 
longer any relative sanctuary behind the front-lines of armed conflict to which people 
displaced by fighting could spontaneously relocate and establish new villages. The IDP 
problem was therefore pushed up against the Thailand border at the same time that the 
Thai government’s asylum policy hardened. Fewer refugees were allowed into Thailand. 
 
Most publicly available data on displacement in rural Burma, and Karen State in 
particular, therefore comes from humanitarian, human rights, and activist groups 
working in Burma across the border from Thailand. The quality of such reports is 
generally very high. However, they tend to focus almost exclusively on IDPs in hiding in 
the war zones––the most needy, but not the only category of IDP in Burma. Much less 
is known about displaced people in government-controlled areas, including relocation 
site residents, and those who spontaneously relocate to existing towns and villages.  
 
Only by undertaking comprehensive, participatory surveys will local or international 
agencies be able to gauge what IDPs in different situations actually want and need––that 
is, what kind of remedy to their particular situation is appropriate. In some cases, the 
desired outcome will be local integration, in others relocation to another area, while in 
yet others it will be to return home, even if that home is long in the past. As in refugee 
repatriation, the principle of an informed and voluntary choice should be central to any 
decisions addressing displacement situations in Burma. Representatives from displaced 
communities, for example, should be given opportunities to investigate the situation in 
possible return areas before deciding whether to return or to seek some other durable 
solution. 
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The research findings presented above caution against assuming that all IDPs necessarily 
want to return “home.” Many will wish to do so, but others will want to stay put and 
therefore need assistance in securing livelihoods and protection where they are currently 
settled. In such cases, limiting aid to IDPs may not be appropriate, especially if displaced 
people are living alongside the non-displaced or those not recently displaced. The focus 
instead should be on the whole community, from a perspective of the protection of 
economic and social rights, as well as civil and political rights.  
 
Policy options  
Since 2004 some IDPs have begun to return from hiding places in the jungle and from 
relocation sites to begin the task of rebuilding their lives and their communities.137 
However, the Tatmadaw’s continued use of forced labor, confiscation of farmland, and 
arbitrary taxation remains a severe constraint on any post-conflict rehabilitation.  
 
IDP return is a delicate process. The needs and wishes of IDPs in Burma are not well 
known. Fully understanding the needs of IDPs requires comprehensive, participatory 
surveys. An admittedly limited Human Rights Watch survey asked informants what they 
felt it would take “to change in their current situation, in order to be able to lead the 
kind of life they have reason to value.” Only half wanted to return their “original” home 
and/ or land, if conditions allowed. As previously noted, returning home is a 
problematic concept, given that most people had moved numerous times and it was not 
usually clear to which of various previous settlements informants wished to return––
although they often appeared to want to return to their place of birth. Most people said 
that they would like to remain where they are, if conditions improved. Nearly half the 
Karen IDPs told Human Rights Watch that they were most interested in opportunities 
to breed livestock and farm properly and to improve their income and food security. A 
third of interviewees wanted better access to education, health services, and proper 
sanitation and water. 
  
As in refugee repatriation, the principle of informed voluntariness should prevail above 
all other considerations. Any attempts to assist displaced Karen villagers or refugees 
must take account of the ongoing problems experienced by conflict-affected populations 
in other parts of Burma. The protection of civilians must be a priority. At a minimum, 
landmine clearance should precede any major return initiative.138 
                                                   
137 Human Rights Watch interview with ex-KNU ceasefire group officer, May 6, 2005. 
138 “The reality is that thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of IDPs are going to return to their home areas.... 
Many lands are now ownership free due to a long armed conflict. People will rush to these areas in order to 
obtain the best lands at the soonest time possible. This is one of the reasons some people have chosen to 
remain as internally displaced rather than go into refuge in a neighboring country. Although they may know 
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VII. Recommendations 
 
To the Burmese government, the “State Development and Peace 
Council:” 
• Publicly and officially order the Tatmadaw and other state security agencies to 
end all human rights absuses and humanitarian law violations against civilians, 
including extrajudicial executions, torture, sexual violence, land confiscation, and 
forced labor. 
• Create a credible legal process to provide redress and to hold perpetrators, 
regardless of rank, accountable for human rights and humanitarian law 
violations. Make this process transparent so as to create public and international 
confidence that a new policy has been devised and is being implemented. 
• Invite the Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights on the 
situation of human rights and the U.N. Secretary-General's Representative on 
the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons to visit Burma and provide 
unfettered access to areas of conflict and displacement, including Relocation 
Centers and Villages, to assess the situation on the ground and to make 
recommendations to assist IDPs. 
• Allow impartial international humanitarian agencies to provide assistance and 
protection to IDPs.  
• Recognize the legitimate and necessary role of independent NGOs and CBOs in 
providing assistance to IDPs, in receiving funds to provide such assistance, in 
working with local communities and individuals to ascertain their needs, and to 
advocate on behalf of IDPs. 
 
To the KNU and KNLA: 
• Publicly and officially order the KNLA and any other armed groups operating in 
Karen State to end all human rights abuses and humanitarian law violations 
                                                                                                                                           
where the mines are nearby their current place, they will leave that place, and leave no mark of where the 
mines are…. There will be massive casualties, and they will swiftly overwhelm the paltry health services 
currently available. It will be a tragedy of massive proportion, and as the catastrophe takes place, word of it will 
probably halt any movement by persons in refuge in Thailand…. Relentless insistence that all areas be marked 
…must begin now. This will have both a preventative and an awareness raising effect.” Burma/Myanmar Report 
2004, Landmine Monitor, October 2004, p. 1. Burma is not one of the 149 signatories to the 1997 Landmines 
Treaty, officially titled the "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti 
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction." 
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against civilians, including forced labor. Take appropriate action against persons 
responsible for human rights abuses and humanitarian law violations.  
 
To the SPDC and KNU:  
• Publicly pledge to respect the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement. 
• Ensure that any ceasefire agreement includes specific commitments on human 
rights protections, including full access to local and international monitors, 
including from the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross.  
• Ensure that any ceasefire agreement includes provisions for regular meetings at 
the field-level that include Tatmadaw officers and government officials, KNLA 
officers and KNU officials, villagers’ representatives, and human rights monitors 
to monitor the situation on the ground and address the inevitable post-ceasefire 
rights violations. 
• Offer ordinary villagers a greater role in political negotiations and in identifying 
community needs and directing and delivering aid. 
 
To the United Nations, international aid agencies, and other donors: 
• Work together to create a strategy to address the SPDC, KNU, and other armed 
groups and with civil society to provide greater human rights protection, to 
better monitor the human rights and humanitarian situation, to provide 
necessary humanitarian assistance, and to engage in joint advocacy efforts on 
behalf of IDPs.  
• Engage in policy discussions with local and national government, and ceasefire 
and non-ceasefire groups, regarding health, education, food, livelihoods, land 
and property rights, landmines, agriculture, HIV/AIDS, gender, children, and 
basic needs.  
• Ensure that the delivery of humanitarian assistance is carried out independently 
without unnecessary interference from government or military officials and 
opposition armed groups. Resist efforts by authorities to interfere with the 
impartial delivery of assistance or manipulate it for other purposes, such as to 
extend military control.  
• Provide assistance to develop civil society among a wide array of 
nongovernmental and community based organizations.  
• Ensure that international aid efforts also have a capacity building objective that 
attempts to identify and support local NGOs, CBOs, and individuals, especially 
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among under-represented groups (such as non-Christians, minorities within 
States, women), to build their capacity to deliver assistance and to act as 
advocates for IDPs. For example: 
o Define a conscious goal of empowering local communities and civil 
society groups. Donors should reach out to and work with all 
communities, not just elites and narrow groups of “westernized” NGOs.  
o Work with CBOs and local NGOs to develop mechanisms for ensuring 
accountability to donors and beneficiaries, and to promote impartiality, 
inclusiveness and participation, protection, conflict resolution and 
gender awareness.  
o Avoid donor-driven initiatives by encouraging genuine partnership and 
joint ownership of projects with civil society actors. 
o Coordinate donor reporting and evaluation requirements. 
o Be flexible in relations with civil society groups, especially regarding 
monitoring in remote areas. If local NGOs demonstrate accountability, 
it is not always necessary for expatriate staff to visit all project sites. 
o Be prepared to respond to small-scale project proposals, in order to 
nurture the development of fledgling CBOs. Consider providing core 
funding to local NGOs.  
o Provide strategic planning and organizational development advice to 
local NGOs and CBOs. 
o Initiate regular international-local NGO forums at the State level.  
• Work with national and local government, including ceasefire and non-ceasefire 
groups, to build schools and train teachers, provide in-service training and 
teaching materials, promote local language enhancement policies, and provide 
non-formal, vocational and skills training and materials; to build clinics, train 
medics, and provide medicine; to establish micro-credit programs; to support 
natural resource management and environmental protection; and to work with 
community social and business leaders to develop sustainable commercial 
activities, such as community forestry and agriculture projects. 
• Donors should also work with non-ceasefire groups to provide humanitarian 
assistance to IDPs, as such groups often protect IDPs. Efforts should be made 
to create a dialogue to better map highly vulnerable IDP movements and to 
provide assistance. This should be done in the spirit of independent and 
impartial humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilians.  
• Provide high quality security and protection training to all field staff. 
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• Incorporate “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments” (PCIA) into the planning 
and evaluation phase of all projects. Needs and vulnerability assessments should 
mainstream protection issues.  
• Fund studies and surveys on health, education, food, livelihoods, land and 
property rights, landmines, agriculture, HIV/AIDS, gender, children, and other 
basic needs in conflict and ceasefire areas in order to draw lessons about how to 
operate in each area and to identify the benefits of ceasefires for IDPs and 
others. Develop participatory research programs to identify specific information 
gaps and humanitarian protection needs.  
• Identify affected communities’ local protection and self-help strategies and 
capacities and the impact of local and international assistance and protection 
interventions. Conduct research in partnership with and provide appropriate 
training to local populations, CBOs, and appropriate government officials, such 
as those working in health, education, or agriculture.  
• Ensure that advocacy recommendations and action plans are drafted in close 
consultation with affected communities, with special attention to the 
participation of women. Aim for concrete proposals regarding the types of 
changes required and how these might be implemented. Opposition and activist 
groups must demonstrate that their recommendations reflect the needs and 
aspirations of affected populations.  
 
To the Government of the Royal Kingdom of Thailand: 
• Extend asylum to all those fleeing ongoing conflict and human rights abuses in 
Burma, protecting Burmese refugees from refoulement and allowing new asylum 
seekers access to Thai territory. Ensure that conditions for return to Burma in 
safety and dignity to be genuinely and durably established prior to commencing 
any organized return or repatriation from Thailand.  
• Give clear guarantees to humanitarian agencies that they may work without 
interference and without fear of closure by the Thai authorities if they advocate 
for either the rights of IDPs in Burma or asylum seekers and refugees in 
Thailand. 
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